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The emergence of retail technologies and data analytics in recent times has 
drastically changed the retail industry landscape in terms of consumer behavior 
and firm pricing and promotion strategies. From consumers’ perspective, 
consumers nowadays have access to channels such as mobile phones to get real-
time price and promotion information about products and services. From 
retailers’ perspective, most retailers have invested heavily in CRM systems and 
data analytics as the center of business activities. This thesis focuses on two 
recent retail technologies: Location-Based Service (LBS) and Customer 
Relationship Management (CRM) Systems; and studies their economic impact 
on pricing, promotion and competitive strategies. Study 1 presents a complete 
analytical study on optimal pricing and adoption strategy with LBS. The results 
show that in the optimal LBS strategy for LBS infomediary as a coupon delivery 
channel, retailers either adopt or reject LBS together, depending on the size of 
uninformed segments and reach of LBS. The location feature of LBS allows the 
retailers to price more aggressively in order to garner greater demand at the 
initial stage, which in turn limits the equilibrium profit in the subsequent pricing 
stages. We compare the results for both Internet and LBS infomediaries, and 
discuss the implications of our findings on retailers’ pricing, promotion and 
technology adoption strategies for LBS. Study 2 presents an empirical approach 
to determine the optimal pricing and promotion strategies based on behavioral-
based segmentation. The business value of CRM Systems depends on whether 
retailers target the right customers, and employ targeted pricing and promotion 
v 
 
strategies. By analyzing the data on consumer profile and purchase history from 
the CRM Systems of a fashion retailer, we have developed a customer 
profitability model and segmentation strategy based on consumer demographics 
and behavioral-based characteristics using the finite-fixture model. The results 
can be used to assess the profit impact of pricing and promotion, and provide 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Research Background 
The ubiquitous of retail information technology (IT) has led to unprecedented 
change in the retail industry. The recent emergence of retail technology and data 
analytics has drastically changed the landscape of retail industry in terms of 
consumer behavior and firms’ pricing, promotion and competitive strategies. 
From the consumer perspective, consumers can now make use of channels such 
as mobile phones to get real-time price and promotion information about 
products and services. This has reduced the information asymmetry and posed 
a significant challenge to retailers in terms of pricing strategies in different 
channels. Moreover, mobile devices and apps can serve as an additional 
marketing channel for retailers to implement price discrimination. As a result of 
their strategic learning and multiplicity of channels, consumers are now more 
sophisticated about their purchase behavior. 
   From the retailer perspective, most retailers nowadays have invested heavily 
in Customer Relationship Management (CRM) and data analytics as the center 
of business activities. Specifically, retailers regularly use CRM (e.g., loyalty 
program) to collect customer data on every possible aspect in order to know 
more about consumer preferences and demands. The CRM data are widely used 
to determine the nature and price of products and services to be offered to 
customers, and the channels to be used at any given point of time. This includes 
promotion planning, discounting, and posted pricing. At the same time, the 
strategic learning and stockpiling behaviors of consumers pose significant 
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challenges to the retailers’ profit maximization goals in terms of optimal pricing 
and promotion planning. As a result, the adoption of these retail technologies 
bring significant challenges on pricing strategies and raise new theoretical and 
empirical issues connected with existing research. 
    This thesis aims to investigate the optimal pricing and promotional strategies 
in the dynamic IT-enabled retail environment. Specifically, it presents two 
studies focusing on the economic impact of two recent retail technologies: 
Location-Based Service (LBS) and Customer Relationship Management 
(CRM). First, LBS is broadly defined as: any application, service, or campaign 
that incorporates the use of geographic location of the user to deliver a service 
or a marketing message (Mobile Marketing Association 2011). LBS is unique 
in utilizing the location information of users in real time; many novel LBS 
services therefore do not have a counterpart in the traditional e-commerce world. 
The consumer and advertiser expenditure on LBS is expected to approach 10 
Billion USD by 2016 (Strategy Analytics 2011). An increasing number of large 
businesses, such as Starbucks, American Express, and Wal-Mart, are already 
leveraging the features of LBS actively to drive store traffic, increase brand 
awareness and interact with consumers. 
    On the other hand, CRM has been integrated into every step of the business 
process, right from handling product inquiry, marketing & advertising, sales, 
transaction, and service (Sun 2006).  In this study, CRM is defined as the 
practice of analyzing and utilizing marketing databases and leveraging 
communication technologies to determine corporate practices and methods that 
will maximize the lifetime value of each individual customer (Reinartz and 
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Kumar 2006). Through CRM system adoption, firms potentially gain repeat 
business and, at the same time, obtain rich consumer data to aid their future 
CRM efforts. CRM nowadays spans various industries, including retail, travel, 
and financial sector.  For example, Tesco is one of the successful retailers that 
extensively use a customer database and is frequently cited in textbooks as a 
successful benchmark for database marketing (Reinartz and Kumar 2006). It is 
critical to study how CRM-based marketing mix and price markdown affect the 
contribution of the consumer segments to sales volumes and profitability.  
    Despite the prevalence of loyalty programs and CRM system implementation, 
their effectiveness vis-à-vis profit is not well understood (Bolton et al. 2000).  
However, on an average, the companies with loyalty programs posted a 2.28 
percent comp sales increase, while those without loyalty programs saw 4.26 
percent gains in the U.S. retail market (McKinsey 2012). A recent survey 
(Forrester Research 2013) reveals that more than half of companies value their 
loyalty programs as strategic priorities, but only 35% of their members redeem 
awards. Since less than half of a company’s customers are enrolled, the bottom 
line is that only 16% of the customer base is motivated by loyalty rewards. 
Although CRM benefits customers in terms of savings and satisfaction, the sales 
and profit impact is unclear and effective analytics is critical to achieve the 
desired targets. 
   In today’s competitive fashion market, segmentation is a key to effective 
customer profitability management. Segmentation helps optimize investments 
in product development, channel management and marketing communications. 
This study therefore aims to investigate how customer information from CRM 
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system can be used to identify the target customers and optimal markdown 
pricing strategies to achieve profit maximization. Specifically, it is looking at 
implementing behavioral-based segmentation based on CRM in order to select 
the most profitable customers and offer optimal markdown strategies. With their 
underlying behavioral profiles, the approach helps retailers to build effective 
targeted pricing and marketing strategies. With the declining cost of 
implementation and ubiquity of CRM system adoption, behavioral-based 
segmentation is the key in target pricing. Retailers thereby optimize the 
allocation of total marketing spend, launch tailored CRM activities and 
effectively increase their sales margins and revenues. 
1.2 Overview of Studies 
This thesis presents two studies, using different methodologies, to analyze the 
pricing and promotion strategies in the technology-enabled retail environment. 
The multiple methodologies complement each other and allow us to investigate 
a variety of research issues from different perspectives. 
1.2.1 The First Study 
Chapter 2 presents a study that uses analytical modeling to delineate optimal 
pricing and adoption strategy with LBS. We build a novel model that integrates 
two most popular pricing models in literature, viz. Hotelling pricing model for 
analyzing location differentiation and ‘Model of Sales’ for analyzing couponing 
strategy. We consider a game in which the retailers first decide whether to adopt 
LBS. The LBS technology allows the retailers to offer one additional discount 
price to consumers and the consumers, in turn, can use LBS to compare prices 
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of participating retailers. As a result, LBS plays the role of a new coupon 
delivery channel and a price comparison engine in this model at the same time. 
In Stage 2, consumers decide on the mall to be visited first based on the expected 
retail price. On reaching the mall, a proportion of the consumers with LBS will 
receive additional discounted prices from participating retailers. Consumers 
then make final purchase decisions based on the lowest price offered to them by 
retailers. 
    This study focuses on two key features of LBS: a new coupon delivery 
channel and a new infomediary meant to compare prices and products. Although 
retailers have long been offering paper coupons for many years, mobile 
platforms provide allow retailers to offer new fun-based, personalized coupons 
to potential buyers at significantly lower costs. According to a market research 
report, 47% of mobile consumers want retailers to send coupons to their mobile 
devices when they are in or near the store (Loyalty360). Foursquare is a 
pioneering service, having more than 40 million users worldwide as of 2014. 
The users of Foursquare earn badges and coupons for visiting (via check-in) 
restaurants and local stores multiple times. Following the success of Foursquare, 
many entertaining and novel coupon apps have emerged recently. For example, 
CheckPoints presents users with a list of available products in the nearby 
participating retailers. The shoppers can use the phone’s camera to scan the 
barcodes on those participating products to earn prizes, while users don't have 
to buy anything (Washington Post 2011). CheckPoints' retail partners are 
banking on the fact that most users will end up buying the products being 
scanned. Similarly, ShopKick partnered with Target, Macy's, Simon malls and 
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other leading retailers to provide indoor LBS couponing services. ShopKick has 
installed sensors in store ceilings to track users' activities in a store. Users can 
collect points simply by roaming around in the retail stores. As a result, the 
number of store walk-ins increased 60%, and customers with ShopKick buy 
twice as often as non-ShopKick users (USA TODAY 2012). According to AC 
Nielson (2013), the majority of smartphone (63%) and tablet (53%) owners 
search and scan their ways to savings in aisles. And the savings continue at the 
checkout lane, where smartphone shoppers are more likely to use their devices 
for mobile coupons (34%) and payments (23%). 
    As an infomediary, LBS have changed the way consumers gather price and 
product information. Nearly 40% of smartphone owners use their phones for in-
store price comparisons, making it the top mobile shopping-related activity 
(MarketWatch 2012). During the holiday season in 2011, 19% of consumers 
used their phones to compare products and prices in stores. This success is a 
result of the fact that app developers brilliantly utilize various features to make 
the search and price comparison easier than their e-commerce counterparts. 
With a smartphone, users can compare prices by using the following input 
methods: type in a product name (as in old days), scan a barcode or QR code on 
products, speak product’s name to an app, take a picture of the product, or 
simply point the camera to the product with Augmented Reality apps that 
automatically display the product information on screen of devices. For 
example, an app named Price Check by Amazon provides almost all the 
aforementioned input methods for the purpose of price comparison. The Google 
Shopper app shows all the places where an item is available, both online and in 
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nearby physical stores. The Consumer Reports’ Mobile Shopper app provides 
not only price comparison, but also group’s expert ratings, reviews and buying 
advice. 
These two unique features of LBS motivated us to study how the adoption of 
LBS apps could affect retailers’ pricing and profitability. On the one hand, LBS 
couponing apps are likely to attract more traffic to the retailers’ stores. On the 
other hand, price comparison apps and LBS couponing may intensify the price 
wars among retailers in the same neighborhood, leading to lower profit margins. 
It is not obvious that increases in sales volumes can outweigh the decreases in 
profit margins. In other words, in a game theoretic model, it is intriguing to 
study the equilibrium retailers’ LBS pricing strategy, LBS adoption strategy and 
associated equilibrium profits. 
We analyze the model by considering all three possible cases for LBS 
adoptions separately. In each case, we solve the game backward and derive the 
equilibrium pricing for each retailer. We then derive the optimal LBS strategy 
based on their equilibrium profits in the three possible cases. There are some 
interesting results. Firstly, the equilibrium adoption strategy of LBS is that 
‘neither of the retailers join the LBS’ or ‘both retailers join LBS’, depending on 
the size of uninformed segment and reach of LBS; while the equilibrium for 
internet infomediary is that only one retailer adopts infomediary. Essentially, 
the location feature of LBS is likely to intensify the price competition as retailers 
would be compelled to price more aggressively to compete for consumers, 
which would resultantly limit the profit in the subsequent pricing stage. This 
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negative competition effect overwhelms the positive effect of price 
discrimination and potential additional demand resulting from LBS adoption. 
1.2.2 The Second Study 
Chapter 3 presents an empirical study on optimal markdown strategies founded 
on behavioral-based segmentation. The ubiquitous implementation of CRM 
system and data analytics has drastically changed the landscape of retail 
industry in terms of consumer behavior, firm pricing and promotion 
strategies. The business value of CRM system relies on whether retailers can 
target the right customers and employ targeted pricing and promotion strategies.  
    Study 2 thus aims to propose an empirical approach to determine the optimal 
pricing and promotion strategies founded on behavioral-based segmentation in 
the fashion goods industry. Specifically, we focus on markdown pricing, which 
is the most commonly used strategic tool for profit maximization in seasonal 
goods industries such as apparels, ticketing and airlines. A behavioral-based 
segmentation founded on CRM selects the most profitable customers and offers 
optimal markdown strategies accordingly. The behavioral-based segmentation 
captures consumer heterogeneities from two aspects. Firstly, retailers 
differentiate their pricing and promotion efforts based on customer differences 
in demography and history at an individual level. Secondly, retailers further 
differentiate their pricing and marketing strategies based on customer 
differences in response to markdown and promotions. As a result, Chapter 3 
focuses on the following research questions: 
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1. What are the distinct consumer segments, in terms of markdown 
sensitivities and promotion responsiveness, in the context of seasonal 
goods? 
2. What is the profitability impact of markdown pricing and promotions 
for different consumer segments? 
3. What are the optimal markdown levels for each consumer segment, for 
profit maximization?  
4. What is the optimal target markdown strategy, based on the derived 
profitability segmentation?  
    By analyzing the data on consumers’ profile and their purchase history from 
CRM system of a fashion retail chain and using a finite-fixture model, we 
develop a customer profitability model and segmentation strategy founded on 
consumer demographics and behavioral-based characteristics. The finite 
mixture modeling approach has been widely applied and its performance has 
been well documented in marketing and economics literature. The finite mixture 
model  (Wedel and Kamakura 2000) is a modeling technique that is used  to  
simultaneously  derive segments  and  segment-specific  weights  that  relate  an  
outcome  or  dependent variable  (e.g.,  demand or profit)  to  a  set  of  
independent  or  explanatory  variables  (e.g., markdown and promotion). The 
results are used to assess the impact of pricing and promotion on profits, and 
these have key implications on the optimal segment targeting strategy for both, 
research and practice. 
1.3 Positions and Contribution 
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This thesis mainly focuses on assessing the economic impact of retail 
technology on the retailer market in terms of pricing/promotion strategies and 
profitability. Theoretically, the profitability of retail technologies 
implementation depends on the retailer’s ability to devise successful price 
discrimination strategies based on effective segmentation strategies. In this 
thesis, we examine two types of segmentation and corresponding price 
discrimination strategies. Firstly, consumers can be heterogeneous in terms of 
their informational differentiation on price information about products and 
distance to shopping areas, and this is the focus of the first study of the thesis. 
In this case, IT plays a key role as a promotion channel for coupons as well as 
an infomediary. Secondly, consumers can be segmented on the basis of their 
actual historical purchase behavior. Behavioral-based segmentation allows the 
retailers to offer differentiated pricing and marketing strategies based on 
consumer level metrics as well as differences in responses. The resulting IT-
enabled targeting strategy is a key factor in CRM success.  
   As discussed in the literature review sections in Chapter 2 and 3, this thesis 
focuses on how the adoption of the two retail technologies affect the consumer 
segmentations and associated pricing and promotion strategies. This thesis 
adopts multiple methodologies in order to make comprehensive investigations 
of the problem from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. 
    Specifically, the analytical results in Study 1 provide several implications for 
research. Firstly, this study addresses how LBS essentially changes the 
consumer segmentations. On the one hand, LBS as an additional coupon 
delivery channel increases retailers’ ability to engage in price discrimination 
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and attract more store traffic. On the other hand, the infomediary feature of LBS 
introduces intensified price competition among retailers in a given 
neighborhood. The interaction of the two effects reveals a unique dynamic in 
terms of adoption strategies, compared to the prevailing internet infomediary. 
Secondly, the derived equilibrium profit and pricing depend on the level of 
information differentiation, travel cost parameters, and the reach of LBS. More 
importantly, the equilibrium adoption pattern depends on relationships between 
the size of uninformed segment and adoption rate. Thirdly, our analysis 
highlights the strategic importance of posted prices and location competition in 
considering shopping malls concepts. 
    The empirical results in Study 2: This study aims to contribute to existing 
research from three perspectives. Firstly, this study contributes to research on 
consumer heterogeneity in sales responses. In particular, we consider behavior-
based variables as covariates for segmentation. Previous studies mainly used a 
behavioral-based approach via cluster analysis for the purpose of segmentation. 
However, this has been largely ignored when applying finite-mixture modeling. 
Moreover, previous research also shows that a demographic-based approach is 
not very effective in FMM-based segmentation  (Allenby and Rossi 1998). 
Given the modeling advantage of FMM, our analysis demonstrates how 
behavioral-based characteristics and responses from CRM can be effectively 
used in FMM-based segmentation in literature. Secondly, this study focuses on 
markdown pricing at the segment level; this has been largely ignored in 
markdown pricing studies, especially in an empirical context. On the one hand, 
existing studies on target pricing are analytical studies, in which consumer 
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segments are often exogenously and explicitly assumed (e.g., (Chen and Zhang 
2009)). On the other hand, empirical studies have largely ignored consumer 
heterogeneity in the investigation of markdown pricing for fashion goods (e.g., 
(Heching et al. 2002)). Last but not least, from the methodological point of view, 
our modeling procedure provides an empirical approach to determine the 
consumer segmentation and optimal markdown simultaneously. Subsequently, 
the analytical approach and profitability model can be used to determine the 
optimal level of markdown for consumer segments, which has key implication 
for practice. This approach offers critical insights for retailers to devise target 
markdown and promotion strategies. Most literature in marketing focuses on the 
selection of promising target customers for promotional campaigns and much 
less on addressing what specific offers to direct to the target groups (Reutterer 
et al. 2006). This study fills this important gap by focusing on profitability 
analysis at a consumer segment level.  
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2 STUDY 1: OPTIMAL PRICING AND ADOPTION STRATEGY 
WITH LOCATION-BASED SERVICES 
2.1 Introduction 
Motivated by the explosive growth of location-based service and its two 
features, this chapter aims to study how the adoption of LBS apps may affect 
retailers' pricing strategies and profitability. At one hand, LBS couponing apps 
may attract more traffic to the retailers' stores. On the other hand, price 
comparison apps and LBS couponing may intensify the price wars among 
retailers in the same neighborhood, leading to lower profit margin. It is not 
obvious that the increases in sales volume can outweigh the decreases in profit 
margin. In other words, it is intriguing to study in a game theoretic model, what 
are the equilibrium retailers' LBS pricing strategy, LBS adoption strategy, and 
the associated equilibrium profits. 
First, retailers have long been offering paper coupons for many years. Mobile 
platforms provide retailers new opportunities to offer potential buyers 
personalized coupons with fun to play at low costs. According to a market study, 
47% of mobile consumers want retailers to send coupons to their devices when 
they are in or near the store (Loyalty360 2013). The pioneering, most successful 
vendor is Foursquare. Users of Foursquare can earn badges as well as coupons 
when visiting (via check-in) restaurants or other local stores several times. 
According to the official website, Foursquare has over 40 million users 
worldwide in 2013. Following Foursquare, many entertaining and novel coupon 
apps have emerged recently. For example, CheckPoints can present users with 
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a list of available products in the nearby participating retailers. The shoppers 
use the phone's camera to scan the barcodes on those participating products to 
earn prizes while users don't have to buy anything (Washington Post 2011). 
CheckPoints' retail partners are banking on the fact that most users will end-up 
buying the product being scanned. Similarly, ShopKick partnered with Target, 
Macy's, Simon malls and other leading retailers to provide indoor LBS 
couponing. ShopKick installed sensors in store ceilings to track users' activities 
in a store. Users can collect points simply by roaming around in the retail stores. 
With ShopKick, the number of store walk-ins increased 60% and ShopKick 
users buy twice as often as non-ShopKick users (USA TODAY 2012). 
According to AC Nielson (2013), the majority of smartphone (63%) and tablet 
(53%) owners search and scan their ways to savings in aisles. And the savings 
continue at the checkout lane, where smartphone shoppers are more likely to 
use their devices for mobile coupons (34%) and for payment (23%). 
    As an infomediary, LBS have changed the way consumers gather price and 
product information (See appendix for an example of mobile app by Yelp). 
Nearly 40% of smartphone owners use their phones for in-store price 
comparisons, making it the top mobile shopping-related activity, according to 
MarketWatch (2012). During the holiday season in 2011, 19% of consumers 
used their phone to compare products or prices in store. This success results 
from the fact that app developers brilliantly utilize various features to make the 
search and price comparison easier than their e-commerce counterparts. With a 
smartphone, users can compare prices by the following input methods: type in 
a product name (as in old days), scan a barcode or QR code on products, speak 
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a product's name to an app, taking a picture of the product, or simply point the 
camera to the product with Augmented Reality apps automatically displaying 
the product information on screen. For example, an app called Price Check by 
Amazon provides almost all aforementioned input methods for price 
comparison. Google Shopper app can show users all the places an item is 
available online and in nearby physical stores. Consumer Reports Mobile 
Shopper app provides users not only price comparison but also group's expert 
ratings, reviews and buying advice. 
We build a novel model that integrates two most popular pricing models in 
the literature: Hotelling pricing model for analyzing location differentiation and 
"Model of Sales" for analyzing couponing strategy. We model a retailer market 
with two distant shopping malls, each of which has two retailers, at the two ends 
of a Hotelling line. On the Hotelling line, there are three groups of consumers, 
an assumption that is the same as in the "Model of Sales" by Varian (1980). 
Among three groups of consumers, two consumer segments are uninformed and 
only know about the price of one store. The remaining one segment is informed, 
smart shoppers who know the prices of both retailers. We consider a game in 
which the retailers first decide whether to adopt LBS. LBS allows the retailers 
to provide one additional discount price to consumer and the consumers can use 
LBS to compare prices of participating retailers. As a result, LBS in this model 
plays the role of a new coupon delivery channel and as a price comparison 
engine at the same time. In Stage 2, consumers will decide which mall to go 
first based on the expected retailers' price. Lastly, once consumers reach mall, 
a proportion of them with LBS will receive additional discounted prices from 
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participating retailers. Consumers make final purchase decisions based on the 
lowest price offered to them. 
We analyze the model by considering all three possible cases for LBS 
adoptions separately. In each case, we solve the game backwardly and derive 
the equilibrium pricing for each retailer. In particular, the third-stage store 
pricing game follows the existing results from existing literatures on price 
dispersion (Chen et al. 2002; Narasimhan 1988; Varian 1980) and treat LBS as 
a price referral infomediary. In Stage 2, we incorporate distance between the 
mall and posted prices into the model in order the capture the critical feature of 
LBS, the location. We then derive the optimal LBS strategy based on their 
equilibrium profits in the three possible cases. There are a few interesting results. 
First, the equilibrium adoption strategy of LBS is that “neither of retailers join 
the LBS” or “both retailers join LBS”, depending on the size of uninformed 
segment and reach of LBS; while the equilibrium for Internet infomediary is 
that only one retailer adopt infomediary. Essentially, the location feature of LBS 
is likely to intensify the price competition because retailers need to price more 
aggressively to compete for consumers, which in return, would limit the profit 
in the subsequent pricing stage. This negative competition effect overwhelms 
the positive effect due to price discrimination and potential additional demand 
resulting from adopting LBS. 
This rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the 
related literatures. Section 2.3 discusses the details of model setup. Section 2.4 




2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Economics Literature on Price Dispersion 
This study relates to the economics literature on price dispersion (Baye and 
Morgan 2001; Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Varian 1980). In these models, only a 
subset of consumers called informed consumers or smart shoppers are assumed 
to have access to a complete list of product prices and they can identify the 
product with the lowest price to buy. For instance, Varian (1980) shows that 
firms are more likely to charge either very high price or randomly offer different 
levels of discounts in a mixed strategy equilibrium. In this way, price dispersion 
is a price discrimination device between uninformed and informed consumers 
in the homogeneous goods market. The heterogeneity between these two types 
of consumers is also known as "informational differentiation". In other words, 
firms have the options of serving only the uninformed customers at a very high 
price or serving both informed and uninformed customers at a lower price. The 
seminal finding is that the equilibrium pricing strategy among competing 
retailers is a mixed pricing strategy equilibrium in which the retailers may 
randomly choose a discounted price to compete for the informed customers. 
2.2.2 Marketing Literature on Sales and Promotion 
By extending the solution concept of Varian (1980), several marketing studies 
have investigated various marketing issues such as consumer loyalty, 
sales/promotion strategy (Jing and Wen 2008; Narasimhan 1988), and referral 
infomediary (Chen et al. 2002). The key variables in these studies include the 
size of the loyal consumer segment (Jing and Wen 2008; Narasimhan 1988), 
magnitude of consumer loyalty (Jing and Wen 2008; Raju et al. 1990), as well 
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as depth (Rao 1991) and frequency of the promotion (Narasimhan 1988; Rao 
1991). In contrast to the economic literature, these marketing papers focus more 
on the modeling the demand-side properties as the explanations of price 
dispersion. Consistent with this literature in price infomediary, this study 
models promotional price competition by this setup because similar to Internet 
infomediary, one role of mobile LBS promotion is essentially a channel to let 
consumers become more informed about the price information from nearby 
retailers. One difference in this context is consumers have access to the in-store 
price since they are physically in the store and therefore, the mobile channel 
price must be lower than the in-store price. In contrast, retailers can set different 
prices in on different websites and the customers may not be aware that they are 
buying at a higher price at a price comparison site. 
2.2.3 Information Systems Studies on Internet Referral Infomediary 
Several studies in Information Systems have investigated the impact of Internet 
referral infomediary in the context of e-commerce and e-business. Bakos (1997) 
models the role of buyer search costs and examines the impact of electronic 
marketplaces on consumers' price discovery behavior. In the setting of supply-
chain, Ghose et al. (2007) find that referral services play a critical role in 
enabling retailers to discriminate across consumers with different valuations. 
Moreover, Weber and Zheng (2007) analyze the firms' bidding strategies in 
intermediated search market, given consumers' equilibrium search behavior. Xu 
et al. (2010) study online search strategy. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2005) have 
derived mix-strategy pricing equilibrium for sellers in the context of online 
exchanges. Finally, Iyer and Pazgal (2003) have examined the impact of Internet 
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Shopping Agent on market competition. This model setup is in line with these 
studies. To the best of my knowledge, none of the existing studies has adopted 
this type of model to investigate the impacts of LBS price promotion. 
This study can be considered as an extension of Chen et al. (2002), who 
analyze the effect of internet referral infomediary on retail markets. Specifically, 
we extend Chen et al. (2002) to model the mobile infomediary and couponing 
strategy in the last stage when consumers already arrive at the malls. We have 
extended their model by adding a 2nd stage Hotelling pricing game to 
investigate the impact of adopting LBS on the 3rd stage pricing and couponing 
strategies. More importantly, this study has compared the results of LBS 
infomediary with existing results of Internet infomediary. By this comparison, 
we can highlight the unique impacts LBS infomediary, relative to e-commerce 
infomediary. 




Figure 1 Retailers and Consumer in the Location Market 
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There are two shopping malls (or shopping districts) L and R at the end of a 
Hotelling line with the length normalized to 1 without loss of generality. In each 
mall, there are two retailers and the model can be generalized to a finite number 
of retailers as in the standard "model of sales" (Varian 1980). As shown in 
Figure 1, L₁ and L₂ are located in Mall L while R₁ and R₂ are located in Mall 
R. This shopping mall setup is the first main departure point from the existing 
literature in two ways. First, incorporating mall location allows us to model the 
distinctive feature of LBS; LBS provides product or price information only in 
one specific shopping district. Second, it allows us to incorporate the posted 
price strategy of retail chain stores, which has been under-explored in similar 
models. To model retail chain stores, we simply need to maximize the sum of 
profits of L₁ and R₁. For ease of exploration, we assume each store maximizes 
its store profit. An alternative way to see this setup is that L₁ and R₁ are 
individual retailer for homogenous goods or services. For example, both of 
them are fast-food restaurant but they are maximizing their own store 
profit. In this study, we assume L₁ and R₁ belong to Retail Chain 1 and L₂ and 
R₂ belongs to Retail 2. Retailers are risk neutral and they maximize expected 
profits. For ease of exposition, the variable cost of production and fixed cost are 
all assumed to be zero. The results can be generalized to a constant variable cost 




 Figure 2 Sequence of the Game 
2.3.2 The Sequence of the Game     
The game in this study consists of three stages. In Stage 1, retail chains decide 
whether to adopt LBS. There are three possibilities: 1) Both retail chains adopt 
LBS; 2) Only one retail chain adopts LBS and 3) neither adopts LBS. 
    In Stage 2, all four retailers decide the original retail price. This price will be 
called posted price throughout this paper. Based on posted prices and the 
traveling cost in Hotelling model, consumers then decide which mall to visit. 
This posted price can be understood as "usual price" or "regular price" and is a 
common practice in the current retail industry. Due to the price dispersion, 
retailers seldom sell goods at this posted price, which serves as an upper bound 
on the actual level of price dispersion (Ghose and Yao 2011). Instead it is 
primarily used as a signal to attract customers to visit the shopping malls. 
Previous studies such as (Chen and Iyer 2002) has also explored the effect of 
similar posted price mechanism in the context of consumer addressability, in 
which firms simultaneously choose posted prices and then choose pricing 
strategies that are contingent on the previously chosen posted prices to their 
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addressable consumer segments. In this way, a low posted price may attract 
more consumers to the mall, but it would limit the equilibrium price and profit 
level in subsequent stage. The consumer may conjecture that retailers may offer 
a lower price (than posted price) following a probability distribution (CDF) in 
store or via LBS. 
In Stage 3, each retailer has to make one or two pricing decisions, depending 
on whether they adopted LBS or not in Stage 1. For retailers who do not adopt 
LBS, only one in-store promotional price will be offered to all consumer 
segments. For retailers with LBS, they can offer one additional LBS 
promotional price only to consumers who own smartphones equipped with the 
focal LBS app. In other words, retailer with LBS can set two prices, one in-store 
price and one LBS price, with price dispersion. The objective of retailers is to 
maximize expected profit by setting three prices (posted price, in-store 
promotional price and LBS promotional price) and one LBS adoption strategy. 
We assume both types of discounted prices are lower than the original price, 
which is consistent with the marketing practice. Consumers will choose the 
lowest price among the options offered to them to purchase the product. Please 
refer to Figure 2 for the timeline of this game. Details of the utility function of 
consumers will be discussed in the next section.  
2.3.3 Consumers 
The market consists of a unit mass of consumers on the Hotelling line. 
Consumers have identical valuation for visiting the mall and identical 
reservation price for buying the product. The identical valuation for mall is 
assumed to be v and without loss of generality, the reservation price is 
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normalized to be 1 for simplicity. The unit traveling cost in Hotelling model is 
denoted by t. 
Consistent with the price dispersion literature, consumers are assumed to be 
heterogeneous in terms of price information. Therefore, consumers are divided 
into three segments as in the literature. A proportion β of consumers have access 
to the price information of both retailers and will buy from the retailer that offers 
the lowest price. We call these smart shoppers "informed consumers" 
throughout this paper. There are two other groups of shoppers who only buy 
from one retailer respectively. We assume that iα consumers are "uninformed 
consumers" who only buy from Retail Chain i (i=1, 2). These consumers are 
interpreted as they do not know the focal product is also available at the other 
retailer, or these consumers do not have sufficient price or quality information 
about the other retailer. Hence, they are assumed to buy from their informed 
retailer but not the competing retailer. This setting implies α₁+α₂+β=1. To 
simplify the following analysis, we also assume α=α₁=α₂ and focus on the 
symmetric setting. This symmetric setting approach has been widely adopted 
by many price dispersion studies (Chen et al. 2002). Asymmetric price 
dispersion models lead to qualitatively similar equilibrium with much more 
complicated algebra. 
As explained in the sequence of game, consumers have two decisions to make. 
First, they decide which shopping mall to go. The choice of mall depends on 
two factors: first, the distance between the consumer and two shopping malls 
and second, the expected original prices of retailers within the same shopping 
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mall. Informed and uninformed consumers will have different expected original 
prices. Since uninformed consumers only buy from one retailer (e.g., Retail 
Chain 1), they only compare the posted prices of L₁ and R₁. On the other hand, 
informed consumers would form their expectation by the average posted prices 
of two retailers because of symmetry and consumers has limited information 
about in-store price with dispersion. 
Formally, Let the surplus for going to Mall j be jU , and we have 
1 2
            for  segment















                          (0.1) 
where  =1 2,  = .  
The reservation utility v for mall is assumed to be large enough so that every 
consumer will go to one of the two malls and the market is fully covered. As in 
all pricing models, consumers go to the shopping mall that gives them the higher 
surplus. Note that only informed consumers (β segment) make decision based 
on average prices and uninformed consumer (α₁ and α₂ segments) will not 
consider average posted prices. 
Once they have reach the specific shopping mall, the second decision that 
consumers need to make is to choose a specific retailer to shop. At this stage, 
the uninformed consumers only buy from their informed stores. For example, 
L₁ consumers will only buy from the Store L₁; whereas the β consumers will 
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buy from the store that offers the lower price. Let the utility of buying from 
Retailer i in Mall j be ju , we have 
1 2
1                  for  segment










                              (0.2) 
where  =1 2,  =  
In this setting, consumers make these two decisions separately. Specifically, 
the reservation utility for going to the mall v is different from the reservation 
utility for purchasing the final good, which is 1 in this setup. This assumption 
is consistent with the consumer behavior in practice; consumers typically go to 
mall for more than one purpose; v>1 because consumers also get benefits from 
window shopping, restaurants, and theaters in malls. When consumers adopted 
LBS apps, they will receive one more promotional price via the mobile channel, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
2.3.4 The Impact of LBS 
For the reach of LBS infomediary, we follow the setup by Chen et al. (2002). 
We assume that a fraction k (0<k<1) of consumers who adopted LBS, which is 
exogenously given and is identical across all consumer segments. Consumers 
who use LBS will get additional price quotes from the retailers who adopt LBS. 
A consumer with price information obtained through both LBS and store will 
choose the lowest price and make purchase. In other words, the introduction of 
LBS as infomediary essentially create another channel for consumers to receive 
additional promotion quote and also learn the complete price information from 
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all retailers who join the LBS infomediary. In this way, LBS significantly alter 
the consumer segmentation in the market with information differentiation, as 
shown in Figure 3 and 4 in the next section. 
2.4 Analysis and Results 
The model is solved by backward induction as in all other applied game 
theoretic models. We first analyze pricing equilibrium in the Stage 3, which is 
similar to either standard price dispersion games or the study by Chen et al. 
(2002), depending on the number of retailers who adopt LBS. Then we consider 
the Stage 2's posted pricing game, which is similar to a Hotelling pricing model. 
Finally, we derive the optimal LBS adoption strategy in Stage 1 by comparing 
the equilibrium profits derived in the three subgames (three combinations) of 
LBS adoption strategies. 
2.4.1 Within-Mall Price Competition Game in Stage 3 
In Stage 3, retailers can set in-store prices and LBS prices (if being adopted) to 
maximize profit, and consumers would choose one retailer to make the final 
purchase. In the analysis below, we discuss the equilibrium pricing and profit 
under three possible LBS adoption cases in the following subsections, 
respectively. 
Case 1: Neither Retailer Adopt LBS 
When neither retailers adopt LBS, this subgame is a standard price dispersion 
game in Varian (1980). The only difference is that the price cap in this price 
dispersion model is determined by the posted price set in Stage 2 of the model. 
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In Stage 3, the consumers have already arrived at the shopping malls. Since two 
malls are symmetric, we only need to solve the pricing game in mall L. Let us 
define LD  as the total number of consumers who go to Mall L. Among LD , 
there are 3 types of consumers: two uninformed groups and one informed group 
of consumers. Denote those consumers in Mall L (originally from two 
uninformed segments α₁ and α₂) by 1LD  and 2LD , respectively. Bear in mind 
that these uninformed consumers would only buy from retailers L₁ and L₂ 
respectively. By symmetry, we have 1 2L L LD D Dα= = . Similarly, we denote the 
informed consumers in segment β in Mall L by LDβ , so 2L L LD D Dα β= + . 
These informed consumers would buy from the retailer that offers the lower 
price. Retailer i in Mall L will choose price ip  to maximize the following profit 
function, given the price jp from the competitor. 
( , ) [ ] [ ]
2
L
i i j L i j i L i j i i
Dp p D p prob p p D p prob p p pβπ α β= × + > × × + = ⋅ .(0.3) 
where i≠j, i, j=L₁, L₂. 
Following the standard solution procedure from the price dispersion literature 
(Narasimhan 1988; Varian 1980), we know that there is no pure-strategy Nash 
Equilibrium. In equilibrium all retailers adopt mixed-strategy pricing. In 
addition, let ( )iF p be the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of price and 
iπ be the equilibrium profit for store i, we have the following lemma. 
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Lemma 1: If neither retailer adopts LBS, given the demand in mall LD and the 
price cap cip , the profit and the equilibrium distribution function of price are 
;














= − < <
+
              (0.4) 
This result is standard and can be found in Narasimhan (1988) and Varian 
(1980). One important property is that the retailer's equilibrium profit only 
depends on the size of uninformed segment LDα and the posted price cip . We 
will use these two properties as the building blocks to derive the solution for 
more complicated problems in Stage 1 and Stage 2. 
Case 2: Both Retailers Adopt LBS 
When both retailers adopt LBS, a proportion of the consumers (defined as the 
ratio k) can receive two additional LBS discounted prices on their smartphone. 
In total, now we have 6 types of consumers as illustrated in Figure 3. First, 
among the consumers who use LBS, we have a segment of Lk Dβ × ×  informed 
consumers who know both in-store prices and they also receive two more LBS 
prices. They can make purchase at the lowest price among four available prices. 
As LBS prices are always lower than store price, the final purchase price of 
these consumers is essentially one of the two LBS prices. Second, segments of 
2 LkDα consumers will also receive two LBS prices from both stores and also 
one in-store price from their originally informed store. Since the LBS prices are 
lower than in-store prices, consumers in this segment become perfectly 
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informed of price information of the two stores. They will also shop by the lower 
price among two available LBS prices. In other words, this 2 LkDα consumer 
segment would become informed consumers because of LBS apps. Lastly, the 
remaining (1 ) Lk D− consumers who do not adopt LBS will behave the same 
way as they were in Case 1. Figure 3 visualizes the impact of k on consumer 
segmentation.  
 
Figure 3 Consumer Segmentation with LBS 
As shown in Figure 3, LkD (the shaded area) consumers receive discounted 
prices via LBS. This leads to Bertrand price competition within the LkD
segment. Therefore, the original price competition will be essentially for a 
smaller market with (1 ) Lk D− consumers who do not use LBS. The solution is 
similar to those of Case 1. The difference only lies in the proportion of each 
consumer segment. As a result, we have the following lemma 
Lemma 2: If both retailers adopt LBS, given LD and cip , the equilibrium profit 


















= − < <
+
                 (0.5) 
    Comparing Lemma 1 and 2, the profit of each store has decreased by (1 )k− , 
which shows that the profit is strictly lower in this case when both retailers use 
LBS, due to the reduced information differentiation. Recall that we are 
analyzing two retailers who carry one homogeneous product. Originally in the 
price dispersion models, two retailers are differentiated by the product 
information available to consumers in the sense that some consumers only shop 
in one retailer because they do not know the same product is also available in a 
nearby competing retailer. With LBS apps, consumers become well-informed 
and the differentiation among retailers disappear. The aggravated price war 
ignited by LBS may cannibalize the existing profit, leading to an effectively 
shrunk market size to (1 ) Lk D− . Also bear in mind that although LBS leads to 
price war in Stage 3, it may attract more consumers to this mall in Stage 2, 
creating an intriguing trade-off in this model. 
Case 3: Only One Retailer Adopt LBS 
The most complicated yet unique subgame in the model is when only one 
retailer adopts LBS. Without loss of generality, let Retail Chain 1 be the store 
with LBS whereas Retail Chain 2 does not adopt LBS in this section. Again, we 
analyze the pricing problem in Mall L. Let the in-store price of Retail Chain 1 
be 1Lp and the LBS price be 1
LBS
Lp . Similar to the previous two cases, in the three 
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consumer segments without LBS, the equilibrium pricing strategy is mixed-
strategy pricing as usual in Case 1. 
 
Figure 4 Consumer Segmentation (One Retailer Adopt) 
    Let 1LD , 2LD  and LD  be the demand for Store L₁, L₂ and Mall L. By Chen et 
al. (2002), we can show that the prices offered via LBS channel will be lower 
than in-store prices (Chen et al., 2002, Proposition 1). As shown in Figure 4, for 
α₁ consumers who are informed of L₁, 1LkD  (Area D) now will get lower price 
in LBS while 2LkD of segment α₂ (Area F) who are informed about L₂ will 
become the new informed consumers because they now know 1
LBS
Lp  and 2Lp . 
In this model, Chen et al. (2002) shows that Retailer 1 adopts mixed pricing 
strategies in both in-store (Area A,B,C) and LBS channels (Area D,E,F) 
whereas Retailer 2 adopts mixed pricing strategies in only one retail channel 
(Chen et al., 2002, Proposition 1 and 2). Following Chen et al. (2002) in 
equilibrium, the range of the price of retailer L₁ would be 1 1 1( , )
m c
L L Lp p p∈ and 
the range of LBS price from retailer L₁ is 1 1 1( , )
LBS b m
L L Lp p p∈ , where 
1 12
(1 )








and 1 1(1 )
b m
L Lp k p= − . We follow their setup by 
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assuming k<1-α so that 1 1
m c
L Lp p< . For retailer L₂ (without LBS), the range of 
the price is 2 2 2( , )
LBS b c
L L Lp p p∈ , where 2 22
(1 )








. In other 
words, L₁ who uses LBS charges two different prices in two price intervals for 
the two channels respectively; whereas, L₂ who does not use LBS only charges 
regular store prices. Let 1( )LF p , 1 ( )
LBS
LF p  and 2 ( )LF p  be the CDFs of prices. 
The equilibrium pricing and profit are summarized below. 
Lemma 3: If only one retailer adopt LBS, given 1LD , 2LD  LD  and price cap 
c
ip  ,the equilibrium price distribution functions and profit are 
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The equilibrium pricing and profit are for Store L2 
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In the equilibrium mixed-strategy of pricing, there are two intervals of 
randomized pricing of each retailer. For Retailer 1, in-store price is randomized 
at a higher range to target at the consumers who do not have LBS whereas the 
LBS price is randomized at a lower range to target the consumers with LBS. 
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Retailer 2 will optimally react by offering one randomized price accordingly. 
The profit function in Lemma 3 reveals simple yet intuitive insights on 
profitability. Specifically, for 1L , the first term represents the profit from 
regular store channel. When the store price is charged at 1cLp  , the demand that 
Retailer 1 get will be Area A with the size (1-k) ×DL1. Similarly, the second 
term represents the profit from the LBS channel, i.e. Retailer 1 can get all 
demand from LBS channel (Area D, E & F) by charge the lowest possible price
1
b
Lp . On the other hand, Retailer 2 can get all demand except for Retailer 1's 
uninformed segment (Area A) by charging the lowest price in the price range. 
From Retailer 1's perspective, the trade-off of offering extra discounts via 
LBS includes the following effects. First, the LBS channel allows Retailer 1 to 
poach the other retailer's uninformed consumer (Area F in Figure 4, which 
cannot be reached without LBS). Similar effect has been discussed in the paper 
by Chen et al. (2002). In other words, LBS can serve as a targeted advertising 
channel to poach the competitor's "uninformed" customers. The second 
(negative) effect is that the lowered LBS price may cannibalize the profit from 
Retailer 1's "loyal" customers in Area D in Figure 3. The last effect is that the 
LBS price may intensify the price war between two retailers. In equilibrium, 
Retailer 2 may react by more aggressive pricing because consumers are better 
informed in the LBS market. 
2.4.2 Between-Mall Pricing Game in Stage 2 
Let us consider the effect of posted prices and shopping mall locations. In Stage 
2, both retailers announce the posted price through another channel or media 
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(e.g. Newspaper, Catalog, Website etc.). The posted prices are common 
knowledge to all consumers. The introduction of posted price has two strategic 
effects. First, consumers decide which mall to go based on the posted prices. 
Second, posted price is also the price cap for pricing dispersion game in Stage 
3. The first one affects retailers' profit positively as it increases the demand 
whereas the second one adversely affects retailers' profit because price cap 
inhibits retailers' flexibility in offering discounts in Stage 3. The objective of 
retailers is to set an intermediate, optimal posted price to maximize the store 
profits in Stage 2. For instance, a low posted price may attract more consumers 
to the mall, but it would limit the equilibrium price and profit level in Stage 3. 
The consumer may conjecture that retailers may offer a lower price (than posted 
price) following a probability distribution (e.g. CDF in Lemma 1, 2 & 3) in store 
or via LBS. Once the consumer enters the shopping mall in Stage 3, the 
consumer can know the actual prices offered, including in-store promotion price 
and LBS promotion price (for LBS users). 
    Again we analyze Mall L because of the symmetric setting. Based on the 
surplus for going to one specific mall defined in eq. (1), we can derive the 
demand function of Mall L in the three consumers segments. Specifically, 
denote 1 2, ,L L LD D D β as the sizes of uninformed consumers for α₁, α₂ segments 
and β informed consumer, respectively. Similar to the demand function in 
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Similar to Stage 3's subgames, we will examine three possible cases given 
the LBS adoption strategy in the first stage. 
Case 1: Neither Retailer Adopt LBS 
Based on Lemma 1, we have derived the profit function which only depends on 















where i=L₁, L₂ and j=R₁, R₂. 







    By substituting Lemma 1 into above profit functions and take first-order 
condition (FOC), we have a system of equation for four retailers. As all retailers 
are symmetric we summarize the result in the following proposition. 
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Proposition 1: If neither retailer adopts LBS, the equilibrium posted price and 
profit are 











                                    (0.9) 
where i=L₁, L₂, R₁, R₂. 
    As shown in the results above, the equilibrium posted price and profit depend 
on the size of uninformed segment α and the location parameter t. It is 
straightforward that the critical feature of LBS, the location, plays a significant 
role in determining the equilibrium price and profit. As t increases the profit of 
retailer increases, which means that the more the shopping malls are 
differentiated or distant, the more profit each retailers will get. This is consistent 
with the conventional wisdom of models on location competition. Meanwhile, 
in order to make the posted price mechanism behaves in order, posted price must 
be less or equals to 1, which is the reservation prices of consumers. In other 
words, t needs to be relatively small. This finding explains why many LBS as 
infomediary mobile applications are only widely used in urban areas where 
shopping malls are not distant enough. 
Case 2: Both Retailers Adopt LBS 
In this case, we still assume the proportion of consumers who adopted LBS as 
k. By the similar procedure in Case 1, essentially we solve Case 1 with a smaller 
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market size with (1-k) of the size. The equilibrium posted prices and profit are 
reported in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: If both retailers adopt LBS, the equilibrium posted price and 
profit are 











                                (0.10) 
where i=L₁, L₂, R₁, R₂. 
    Basically the posted prices are not affected and the profit becomes strictly 
lower than that in Case 1. Intuitively, the introduction of LBS would decrease 
the profit because it intensifies price competition by reducing the differentiation 
between two retailers. 
Only One Retailer Adopt LBS 
When only one retailer adopted the LBS, the solution becomes fairly 
complicated because of the asymmetric setting. Without loss of generality, 
assume only L₁ adopted LBS and L₂ did not. Similar to Cases 1 and 2, 
substituting eq. (6) and (7) into the profit functions eq. (8), we then solve the 
first-order-conditions for equilibrium pricing and profit. Results are shown as 
follows. 
Proposition 3: If only Retailer 1 adopts LBS, the equilibrium posted price and 
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where i=L₁, L₂. 
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where j=L₂, R₂. 
2.4.3 LBS Adoption Game in the First Stage 
Equilibrium LBS Adoption Strategy 
By comparing equilibrium profits derived previously, we can have the 
following proposition for the LBS adoption strategy. Detailed proof is discussed 
in the Appendix. 
Proposition 4: Among all three possible adoption scenarios, the equilibrium 
LBS adoption strategy is summarized as follow: 
1. If 1
3
α ≥ , there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria for "Both retailers 













, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria for 
"Both retailers adopt" and "Neither retailers adopt", and a 









, there is one pure strategy Nash equilibrium is 
"Neither retailers adopt". 
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Overall, the above proposition reveals that the optimal LBS adoption behaves 
like a classic coordination problem, in which both retailers either join or do not 
join together. The specific optimal LBS strategy depends on the value of α and 
k. Intuitively, increasing α has a positive impact on retailer's profit because of 
increase in brand differentiation, because it implies more consumers are 
uninformed and only visits one retailer; while increasing k negatively affects 
retailers' profit because it implies that more consumers become well-informed 
by adopting LBS and the LBS price is lower than the in-store prices. As shown 
in Proposition 4-1, when α is large, the potential additional demand (depends 
on α) that can be poached from competitor's original uninformed segment could 
be relatively large, which is the main benefit of adopting LBS. Therefore "Both 
retailers adopt" could be a viable equilibrium strategy for both retailers, even it 
is suboptimal compared to the case without LBS because of competition effect. 
Moreover, when α is relatively small, as long as k is relatively small 
(Proposition 4-2a), the positive benefit from adopting LBS could offset the 
negative effect due to intensified price competition from the LBS channel. Thus 
the two retailers could still join LBS together. However, when α is small and k 
is large (Proposition 4-2b), the unique pure LBS strategy is "Neither retailers 
adopt" because the negative effect of LBS is larger than the benefit from LBS 
adoption. 
By far, we have always assumed the reach of LBS k is the same for 
uninformed and informed consumers for simplicity. In practice, we would 
expect the informed consumers have a much higher LBS adoption rate than the 
uninformed consumers. Now let the reach of LBS for uninformed consumer 
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segment be k and the reach for informed consumer segments be k’, where k’>k. 
A graphical illustration of such case is that a small proportion of Area B is not 
in Area E in Figure 4. We are interested in how a different k’ may affect the 
results of the model. 
First, it is straightforward to see that the profit of Case 1 (without LBS) 
remains unchanged (Proposition 1). Second, the profit for Case 2 (both LBS) 
remains unchanged too, because the profit is based on the size of uninformed 
consumers who are not using LBS, the proportion of which is still k in this 
setting. Lastly, for the most complicated Case 3, consider the profit in 
Proposition 6, generally we can show that the profit for Retailer 1 is an 
increasing function of k, whereas Retailer 2's profit is decreasing in k 1 . 
Intuitively, when k’ increases, the value of LBS increases and Retailer 1 is better 
off with higher profit by extracting more demand and profit from LBS channel; 
whereas Retailer 2 is worse off in return. If we consider the change in the pay-
off matrix that is illustrated in the proof of Proposition 7 in Appendix, with k’, 
Profit A and B remain unchanged. C increases while D decrease. Ultimately, as 
the k’ increases, we would have C>B and A>D, and the equilibrium adoption 
would be (A, A), i.e. "both retailers adopt". 
Generally, we show that consideration of two different values of k for 
informed and uninformed consumers do not significantly affect the results of 
1 To see this, it is trivial to verified that / 0 and / 0i jd dk d dk    in Proposition 3, 
given the condition that 1k    and ' 1k   . 
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equilibrium adoption, in which coordination of adoption could be optimal for 
both retailers. Essentially, increasing k′ transfers part of informed consumers 
from regular store channel (Area B) to LBS channel (Area E) in Figure 4, which 
increases the value of LBS channel and creates a different dynamic of adoption 
pattern. 
Traditional Infomediary vs. LBS Infomediary 
Consider a special case of our model to benchmark our results and highlight the 
unique adoption pattern. If we omit the second stage of the game, in which 
retailers decide posted prices to maximize their profits, we are able to re-
examine the equilibrium profits and LBS strategy of the Internet Infomediary 
by omitting the location of shopping malls. In this study, we call this Internet 
infomediary the "Traditional Infomediary" because it has been prevailing with 
the growth of e-commerce in the past two decades. This Internet infomediary 
has brought benefit to consumers by reducing search cost, because consumers 
can use this service to research price information from retailers. Specifically, 
we extend Chen et al. (2002) by incorporating the "shopping mall" concept and 
the location dimension to capture the distinctive feature of LBS. In this section, 
we solve this special case of traditional infomediary in our setting and compare 
the results with LBS infomediary. 
    In this section, there are no posted prices setting stage. In other words, 
consumers would only consider travel cost when deciding which mall to visit. 
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As a result, there are half of the consumers in each segment that visits one 
mall. In this setting, exactly 
2
βα + consumers visit each mall. In one particular 
mall, there are 
2
α  segment of uninformed consumers for L₁ and L₂, 
respectively and another 
2
β  segment of informed consumers who shop at both 
retailers. Hence, we have 1 2 ,2 2L L L
D D D β
α β
= = =  and 1
2L
D = . Note that all 
these values are now exogenous since we omit posted price competition. Further, 
the price cap for store prices will be the reservation price, which is 1 in the 
model. Based on above lemmas and propositions, we can solve the equilibrium 
pricing and profit. 
The result is generally consistent with Chen et al. (2002).    Comparing the 
profits in three adoption cases, we find that the case when only one retailer 
adopts Internet Infomediary yields the highest profit for both retailers. By 
similar approach, we can easily verify that the equilibrium adoption pattern is 
that only one retailer will join the Internet Infomediary. 
    We can then compare the equilibrium profit of the two types of 
infomediary for all three adoption cases in the following table. First, it is 
straightforward to observe that "Neither adopt" always dominates "Both adopt" 
in both types of Infomediary. More importantly, the dynamic of the LBS 
adoption decision has also changed dramatically. In particular, "only one retailer 
adopts LBS" is the optimal LBS adoption strategy for Internet infomediary, 
while it is not the case for LBS infomediary and we observe a clear coordination 
42 
 
game between retailers' adoption and an asymmetric adoption case is never 
optimal. The reason is that in the setting of Internet Infomediary, the retailer 
without infomediary (Retailer 2) gain higher profit than they may obtain to join 
the infomediary in the case of asymmetric adoption. In the LBS adoption game, 
the retailer without LBS may end up with very low profit. As a consequence, 
that retailer may also adopt LBS because of the competition from Retailer 1, 
even both retailers end up with lower profits than both of them do not adopt 
LBS. 
Table 1 Comparison of Internet and LBS Infomediary 
Case Internet Infomediary LBS Infomediary 
Neither 
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2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, we present a model on location-based service by synthesizing the 
price dispersion model with Hotelling location model and investigate the impact 
of LBS on retailers' pricing, profits and LBS adoption strategy. Specifically, we 
solve the game using backward induction in three adoption cases and derive the 
equilibrium profit and pricing accordingly. We analyze the equilibrium LBS 
adoption strategy by comparing profits in all adoption cases. Our results are 
used to compare against the benchmarking case, Internet infomediary, from the 
literature. The results show that the optimal adoption strategy in Internet 
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infomediary is asymmetric. I.e. Only one retailer would adopt LBS. In contrast, 
in the LBS adoption game, the equilibrium is similar to that of a coordination 
game. 
2.5.1 Implication for Research and Practice 
Our analysis provides several implications for research. First, this study 
addresses how LBS essentially changes the consumer segmentations. On one 
hand, LBS as an additional coupon delivery channel increases retailers' ability 
to engage price discrimination and attract more store traffic. On the other hand, 
the infomediary feature of LBS introduces intensified price competition among 
retailers in the same neighborhood. The interaction of the two effects reveals 
unique dynamic in terms of adoption strategies, compared to the prevailing 
Internet infomediary. Second, the derived equilibrium profit and pricing depend 
on the level of information differentiation, travel cost parameter, and the reach 
of the LBS. More importantly, the equilibrium adoption pattern depends on 
relationships between the size of uninformed segment and adoption rate. Third, 
our analysis highlights the strategic importance of posted prices and location 
competition when considering shopping malls concepts. 
    The analytical results provide several implications for retailers in terms of 
pricing/promotion and LBS adoptions strategies. First, our results can help the 
retailers to design optimal promotional pricing strategies when LBS is adopted 
by herself and/or the competitor, especially within the same shopping region. 
The retailer could make use of the model to understand the key strategic impact 
of pricing variables for pricing decisions. For example, retailers should alleviate 
the posted price competition by setting a higher posted price. A low posted price 
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may not increase overall profits because of local competition from the other 
retailer in the same mall. Second, our analysis provides key implications on LBS 
adoption strategy for retailers, based on the current competitive environment on 
store's brand awareness and the adoption rate of LBS. For example, a prevalent 
adoption of LBS is only optimal when there are a small proportion of informed 
shoppers who know both retailers' prices or the reach of LBS is very small. A 
small LBS adoption could happen in the early stage of adoption lifecycle. In 
practice, we do see that the LBS apps could be more popular and widely adopted 
by fashion retailers or restaurant, in which consumers are more locked-in to 
each brand due to strong consumer tastes/loyalty. Last but not least, because of 
distinct optimal adoption strategies in LBS (compared to Internet), retailers 
should not apply the conventional wisdom to follow the competitors' adoption 
strategy of new technologies, such as LBS. Instead, the retailers could assess 
the pay-off of different adoption scenarios based on market conditions described 
above. Under certain conditions, retailers should collude not to adopt LBS to 
gain higher profit, because LBS triggers the price war. Obviously, consumers 
gain the most from LBS because they have one more channel to receive 
discounted prices and they also have one new infomediary to compare prices 
from more retailers. 
2.5.2 Limitation and Future Research 
Our analysis has made a few assumptions that can be generalized in future 
works. First, we assume the reach of LBS in this model is exogenous, which 
could be relaxed to reflect the real business scenarios. In real world for many 
other applications with the feature of two-sided advertising platform, the 
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adoption of this new platform by retailers should be endogenized. Although we 
provide simple intuition when the reach of LBS is not identical across segments, 
researchers could rigorously model the reach of infomediary as an endogenous 
variable in consumers' utility specification to generate more insights. Second, 
we have omitted the possible coordination strategy between retailer chains and 
retailers for ease of exploration. Particularly, this model considers profit 
maximization decision of each individual stores but not the retail chain for 
model tractability. It may be interesting to investigate an asymmetric setting in 
which one retail chain competes with two individual retailers. By this setting, 
we could analyze whether retailers chain may gain more than individual store 
by adopting LBS. Lastly, this study can be extended by considering vertically 
differentiated malls. It could be interesting to examine the retailers located in 




3 STUDY 2: OPTIMAL MARKDOWN STRATEGY BASED ON 
BEHAVIORIAL-BASED SEGMENTATION: A FINITE-
MIXTURE APPROACH  
3.1 Introduction 
With the ubiquitous implementation of customer relationship management 
systems, retailers have been able to collect a lot of information at the customer 
level, which include detailed customer purchase history, customer demographic 
and even customer attitudes via surveys. The ubiquity of retail data at the 
different levels and the emergence of retail analytics have created tremendous 
opportunities for both retail practitioners and researchers.  
    From the perspective of practitioners, even though the adoption of CRM 
system and loyalty program is prevalent due to the declining cost of 
implementation, however, the value and effectiveness of their implementation 
are debatable in the literature. A recent survey reveals that more than half of 
companies value their loyalty programs as strategic priorities, but only 35% of 
their members redeem awards, and only 16% are motivated by loyalty rewards 
(Forrester Research 2013). Dowling (2002) suggests that loyalty programs do 
not necessarily foster loyalty, they are not cost effective, and the proliferation 
of loyal programs is “hype” or a “me-too” scheme. Conversely, some recent 
studies show that loyalty programs have a positive impact on consumers’ re-
patronage decisions and their share of wallet (Lewis 2004; Verhoef 2003). In 
fact, even with the ubiquity of CRM system implementation, many retailers do 
not collect the right data, analyze the data appropriately, or initiate the optimal 
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marketing actions to achieve the best business objectives, which possibly have 
led to failure of CRM system implementations. As a result, retailers consistently 
struggle with building sustainable and profitable customer relationships.  The 
business value of CRM system is usually based on the fact that whether retailers 
can target the right customers and employ targeted pricing and promotion 
strategies for profit maximization. 
    The empirical context of this study is the fashion apparel market, in which 
markdown pricing is the most commonly used strategic tool for profit 
maximization. Generally, in seasonal goods industries, such as fashion apparel, 
holiday merchandize and tickets of events, the unique demand characteristic, 
such as non-replenished and seasonality, play significant roles. The markdown 
pricing is a prevalent practice in fashion industry due to two reasons: Firstly, 
the growing competition in the industry makes pricing a major weapon for 
competition, especially during shopping seasons such as summer holiday and 
Christmas period. Secondly, the fast changing fashion trends require retailers to 
replenish the inventory after a season. As a result, markdown pricing has been 
used as a strategic tool for profit maximization—via price discrimination and 
targeting—and also for inventory control near the end of the season and product 
lifecycle.  
In the environment of today’s competitive fashion market, segmentation 
becomes the key to effective customer profitability management. Segmentation 
refers to a strategic process of sub-dividing the consumers into  relevant groups 
that share similar characteristics and are significantly different from other 
groups (Kotler and Keller 2011). Segmentation helps optimize investments in 
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product development, channel management and marketing communications. 
Therefore, this study aims to investigate how customer-level information from 
CRM system can be used to understand who are the right customers to target 
and what are the optimal markdown pricing strategies for profit maximization. 
Identifying segments in a consumer population and determining their sensitivity 
to various pricing and promotion variables have been one of the most important 
research issues in the marketing literature due to their impact and the associated 
profit implication (Wedel and Kamakura 2000). Moreover, the determination of 
optimal marketing decisions must account for the substantial uncertainty that is 
a part of  individual-level parameters (Allenby and Rossi 1998).  
This study, using behavioral-based segmentation, captures consumer 
heterogeneities from two aspects. Firstly, retailers can differentiate their pricing 
and promotion efforts, based on customer demographics and history at 
individual level.  Secondly, retailers can further differentiate their pricing and 
marketing strategies based on differences in customer response, which has been 
considered a key factor for CRM success. 
We propose an empirical approach to perform behavioral-based segmentation 
based on CRM, which upon implementation can select most profitable 
customers and offer optimal markdown strategies accordingly. The approach 
helps retailers, with their underlying behavioral profiles, to build effective 
targeted pricing and marketing strategies. With the declining cost of 
implementation and ubiquity of CRM, behavioral-based segmentation is the key 
in target pricing. In this way, retailers optimize the allocation of the total 
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marketing spend, launch tailored CRM activities and effectively increase their 
sales margins and revenue. 
        Various model specifications and methodological approaches have been 
proposed to delineate the underlying customer segments in a given market. 
Finite mixture modeling approach has been widely applied and its performance 
has been well documented in marketing and economics literature. Finite mixture 
model (Wedel and Kamakura 2000) refers to a modeling technique used  to  
simultaneously  derive segments  and  segment-specific  weights  that  relate  an  
outcome  or  dependent variable  (e.g.,  product recommendation  or  rating)  to  
a  set  of  independent  or  explanatory  variables  (e.g., price  of  a  product  and 
product quality), and derive a unique regression model for each of the segments. 
The basic rationale of the finite mixture model is as follow: There are fixed and 
finite numbers of homogenous segments in a market or population. An 
individual belongs to each segment with some probability, which is assumed to 
be a priori invariant across the subjects. Being conditional upon the membership 
in a segment, the probability of an individual’s response is pre-specified with 
varying parameter estimates across the segments. By maximizing the 
unconditional likelihood of the entire sample, the estimates of membership 
probability and the associated parameter estimates can be obtained 
simultaneously. Each subject then can be assigned to a segment based on the 




    Earlier studies on sales responses for markdown pricing and promotion 
mainly examine the effect of promotion at a brand level (Raju 2001). For 
example, how sales-promotions drive marketing outcomes such as sale-volume 
(demand), store visit, consumer share-of-wallet or brand choice. This study 
focuses on profit, which is essentially a financial impact of marketing outcome. 
In this case, it is possible that a markdown and promotional campaign may lead 
to reduction in sales in dollars (profit), if the markdown is too deep. There must 
be an optimal markdown depth that could maximize the profit of the brand or 
category. Hence, this study aims to examine the effect of price markdown and 
promotion, and proposes an empirical approach to derive optimal markdown at 
consumer segment level. 
    In practices, retailers frequently use simple metrics such as Regency-
Frequency-Monetary (RFM) to segment and profile customers using cluster 
analysis. Though, it is simple and easy to implement, RFM-based segmentation 
focuses too much on purchase patterns and driving sales instead of profit 
maximizing. Several  studies have also reported that managers need to rely on 
intuition and on the long-standing methods—RFM and cross-tabulation 
(Verhoef et al. 2003). Furthermore, earlier studies on customer segmentation 
using Finite mixture model mainly used demographic variables as segmentation 
basis (Gupta and Chintagunta 1994) for campaign management or marketing 
responses. The most important aspect of our study is that it uses behavioral-
based characteristics to segment customers using finite mixture modeling 
approach. More importantly, the segmentation is based on behavioral-response 
for profitability and demand model specifically in the context of fashion goods 
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industry. With the abovementioned examples and motivations, the objectives of 
the study are as follows: 
• What are the distinct consumer segments in terms of markdown 
sensitivities and promotion responsiveness in the context of seasonal 
goods? 
• What is the profitability impact of markdown pricing and promotions 
upon different consumer segments? 
• What are the optimal levels of markdown for each consumer segments 
for profit maximization?  
• What is the optimal target markdown strategy based on the derived 
profitability segmentation?  
    We develop an empirical modeling approach to estimate the optimal level of 
markdown for profit maximization. In particular, we develop profit model based 
on exponential Poisson-demand specification. The segmentation and response 
parameters are then modeled and estimated using finite mixture modeling 
approach. The profit model reveals a classical invertible U-shape relationship 
between markdown pricing and profitability, and allows us to derive an optimal 
level of markdown depth.  
    The overall aims of this study are to provide new insights in following 
perspectives. Firstly, we provide an empirical strategy for modeling the demand 
and profitability for seasonal goods industry. The finite mixture modeling 
approach allows us to identify segment and derive simultaneously the 
markdown sensitivity of promotion responsiveness.  Secondly, the implied 
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methodology in this study allows us to segment consumers based on both 
demographic and behavioral-based (RFM, cross-buying, and response) 
characteristics and to employ targeted pricing and promotion strategies. Thirdly, 
the profitability model provides an approach to derive optimal markdown and 
assess the potential profit impact at consumer segment level, which provides 
key implication for optimal targeting strategies based on consumer 
segmentation.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the 
related literatures; Section 3.3 discusses the details of econometric for demand 
and profit; Section 3.4 introduces the data and variables. Section 3.5 presents 
the estimation results and discussions of the results; Section 3.6 concludes this 
chapter.  
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Finite Mixture Model 
Empirical studies primarily adopt two forms of the approach for segmentation 
and modeling estimation at segment-level. Firstly, they sequentially use cluster 
analysis and then estimate consumer responses separately in each of the derived 
segment. Along with this direction, cluster analysis is a natural approach of 
identifying consumer segments and modeling consumer heterogeneity. This 
separation of customers into unique groups is often based on multi-dimensional 
customer information such as observed customer purchase and usage behavior, 
demographic and lifestyle characteristics, or even consumer preferences on 
product and service via self-reported surveys. But this two-step procedure can 
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result in different solutions based on the selection algorithms and variables; 
there is no theory that can be used to justify the choices of variables and 
selection algorithm. The second approach is using finite mixture models (a.k.a 
latent class models or unsupervised learning models) to model unobserved 
population heterogeneity (e.g., consumer, firm) and uncover hidden 
relationships (McLachlan and Peel 2004). Specifically, finite mixture model 
allows researchers to simultaneously derive segmentation and segment-specific 
weights that relate an outcome (dependent) variable to a set of explanatory 
(independent) variables and derive a unique estimation model for each segment 
in a single step (Wedel and Kamakura 2000). Compared to cluster analysis, the 
finite-mixture model provides statistical tests to determine the number of 
segments and significance of parameter estimates (Desarbo et al. 2001). More 
importantly, FMM approach considers individual heterogeneity in response 
parameters during segmentation, which is not considered in cluster analysis in 
the two-step approach. The difference in response pattern provides a key 
difference, especially for behavioral-based segmentation.  DeSarbo et al. (2008) 
have provided a detailed discussion on the comparison of these two approaches. 
    Finite mixture modeling is getting increasing popularity in the empirical 
literatures due to the importance of accounting population heterogeneity in the 
data. For examples, in labor economics, finite mixture model is a popular choice 
to  control the  unobserved person-specific individual heterogeneity (e.g., 
Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) and Keane and Wolpin (1997)). Moreover, 
Crawford and Shum (2005) used finite mixtures to control the patient-level 
unobserved heterogeneity while estimating a dynamic matching model of 
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pharmaceutical demand. Gowrisankaran et al. (2008) estimated a dynamic 
model of voter behavior with finite mixture models in political economics. 
Several strategic research also use finite mixture model to address firm-level 
heterogeneity in firm performance (e.g., (Cool and Schendel 1988; Desarbo et 
al. 2001).  In Information Systems literature, the study of Bapna et al. (2011) is 
the only one that used a finite mixture logit model to classify simultaneously 
firms into homogenous segments and tested the effects of predictors factors on 
firms’ decision choices of Electronic Payment Systems (EPS) adoption. 
Comparing multiple model estimates, the study showcases the importance of 
having segment-based predictive approach in this and other related IS issues. In 
the last two decades in the marketing literature, finite mixture models have been 
considered as a dominate approach to address consumer heterogeneity, which 
is further elaborated in the following section. 
3.2.2 Literatures on Consumer Heterogeneity and Sales Responses 
In the past decades, extensive marketing studies have investigated the customer 
heterogeneity in sales response using finite mixture approach. A seminal work 
by Kamakura and Russell (1989) led to the development of a multinomial logit-
mixture model for market segmentation that is based on differences in 
preferences and price sensitivities across different households. Moreover, Gupta 
and Chintagunta (1994) proposed an extension of the logit-mixture model that 
defines prior segment membership probabilities as a function of concomitant 
(demographic) variables. Jedidi et al. (1997) developed a finite mixture 
structural equation model that treats simultaneously heterogeneity and forms 
market segments in the context of a specified model structure, where all the 
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observed variables are measured erroneously. Kamakura et al. (1996) developed 
a choice model that identifies simultaneously consumer segments on the basis 
of their preferences, response to the marketing mix, and choice processes. 
Bucklin et al. (1998) developed a joint estimation approach to segment 
households on the basis of their responses to price and promotion in brand 
choice, purchase incidence, and purchase quantity decisions. Bucklin and Gupta 
(1992) developed an approach for market segmentation based on consumer 
responses to marketing variables in both brand choice and category purchase 
incidence. Bayus and Mehta (1995) used finite mixture distribution theory to 
develop a segmentation model  targeting potential consumer durable buyers.  
    This study follows a similar approach to address the consumer heterogeneity, 
but aims to contribute to the research area from a perspective of heterogeneous 
response for the profitability model in the context of seasonal goods. 
Specifically, our model takes a deep investigation on markdown variables and 
uses behavioral characteristics as customer-level covariate and responses for 
segmentation. Moreover, this study directly formulates a segment-specific 
profitability model, which allows us to assess the profit impact of price 
markdown at segment-level. 
3.2.3 Markdown Pricing and Revenue Management 
The literature on markdown pricing strategies focuses three important pricing 
decisions: (i) what are the goods to offer markdown, (ii) how much to 
markdown, and (iii) when to apply markdown. Theoretical development of 
pricing markdown has been addressed in the research literature of marketing, 
economics and operations research (Eliashberg and Steinberg 1993; Rao 1984; 
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Rao 1993). Most of the studies on revenue/profit management focus on 
analytical dynamic pricing of seasonal goods with strategic consumer (Aviv and 
Pazgal 2008; Bitran and Mondschein 1997; Gupta et al. 2006; Su 2007). A 
comprehensive literature survey on dynamic pricing by Elmaghraby and 
Keskinocak (2003) suggests the key characteristics of fashion goods as: 1) 
Nonreplenishment, 2) Independent demand over time, and 3) Myopic/strategic 
customer (forward-looking). There are generally two types of markdown 
pricing: 1) temporary markdown (or sales), wherein prices return to the original 
value; 2) permanent (e.g., for clearance), wherein the next price can only be 
lower than the previous one. Majority of the studies address the second type, 
and it is interesting to study the differential impact of the two types.  
    There are limited number of empirical studies in operational research, 
economics, and marketing. The study of Heching et al. (2002) is the only recent 
empirical one  in operational research. They estimated a simple demand model 
using data from a specialty apparel retailer and obtained parameter estimates of 
revenues under various pricing policies. The demand specification in this study 
modeled the season factor and aging factor in a linear demand fashion, which is 
easy yet intuitive to implement. In economics literature, Warner and Barsky 
(1995) examined daily prices of eight goods at seventeen retail stores 
considering  weekly and seasonal price patterns, and focused on the frequency 
of price markdowns on “sales”. In the context of Major League Baseball (MLB) 
ticket prices, Sweeting (2012) showed a significant decline in MLB ticket prices 
when the time of the game approaches, which is mostly due to declining option 
values of the sellers rather than changes in elasticity of demand.  
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    Few authors have contributed in the research area of markdown pricing 
considering fashion retail industry. Gerstner and Hess (1991) showed that 
manufacturers could stimulate sales by a temporary price reduction, a rebate for 
consumers or a combination of both. Promotional pricing is characterized by a 
temporary reduction in prices that revert back once the promotional period is 
over. As such, these studies do not offer much insight on markdown pricing 
decisions of fashion goods. Pashigian (1988) provided empirical evidence on 
sales offered by departmental stores. He gave the growing importance of 
“fashion” (variety) as an explanation for the changes in markdowns over time 
and between merchandise groups. Pashigian and Bowen (1991) provided further 
empirical evidence that demand uncertainty and price discrimination are the two 
alternative hypotheses to explain the markdown pricing.  Hendel and Nevo 
(2013) offered a simple model of demand dynamics and empirically quantified 
the impact of inter-temporal price discrimination on profits and welfare. Our 
study is unique because we directly formulate a segment-specific model to 
assess the demand and profit impact of markdown. In current perspective, the 
analysis based on segmentation is lacking in the research area, which this study 
aims to fill by analyzing segmentation. 
3.2.4 Target Pricing and Profitability 
There are extensive analytical studies investigating the optimal sales/promotion 
strategies for profit maximization. For example, Chen and Zhang (2009) 
investigated whether dynamic targeted pricing based on consumer purchase 
history could benefit a firm even when consumers are “strategic” (forward-
looking). Iyer et al. (2005) compared the strategies of targeted advertising and 
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targeted pricing in a duopoly setting. They concluded that targeted advertising 
increases profit, and not the targeted pricing. The optimal strategy for targeted 
advertising consists of maximum advertising targeting to the loyal customers, 
and less frequently to comparison shoppers. This shows the importance of 
targetability in the profitability analysis of target pricing.  
Many empirical studies have also investigated the impact of target pricing on 
retailers’ profitability. For example, Besanko et al. (2003) explored 
opportunities for targeted pricing for a retailer that only tracks weekly store 
level aggregate sales and marketing-mix information. Shankar and Bolton (2004) 
empirically investigated the determinants of retailers’ pricing decisions, and 
found that competitor factors explained the maximum variance in retailer 
pricing strategies. A most relevant and recent study is by Soysal and 
Krishnamurthi (2012), they developed a structural model to estimate a dynamic 
model of consumer choice behavior in markets for seasonal goods, where 
products are sold over a finite season and availability is limited. 
3.2.5 CRM Literatures in Information Systems and Marketing 
Payne and Frow (2005) documented numerous definitions of CRM (see their 
Appendix). These definitions range from CRM as the implementation of 
specific system to a holistic approach of managing customer relationships that 
simultaneously creates both customer and firm value. There is a comprehensive 
related literature both in Information Systems and Marketing discipline. In 
Information Systems, researchers focus on technological perspective and 
economic value of IT at firm level. Firstly, there is a large stream of research on 
assessing the economic impact of IT investment. For example, several empirical 
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studies (Brynjolfsson 1996; Hitt and Brynjolfsson 1996) focus on how does IT 
investment impact firm performance, productivity and consumer surplus. There 
are also many analytical studies investigating IT value on product quality, and 
cost reduction (Barua et al. 1991; Demirhan et al. 2006; Thatcher and Pingry 
2004). Secondly, there are also a large body of studies focusing on the issues on 
CRM process, implication, and the technology use. For example, Kim & 
Mukhopadhyay (2011) studied the optimal CRM system implementation 
strategies. Studies, for instance, of Hendricks et al. (2007), Mithas et al. (2005), 
and Zablah et al. (2012) focus on enterprise CRM that requires much more 
expenditure of organizational resources. 
    In marketing literature, CRM emerges as “relationship marketing” and 
mainly focuses on CRM strategies. Firstly, the major stream of the studies is 
focussed on optimizing the marketing mix variables to enhance relationship and 
customers’ lifetime value (Rust and Chung 2006; Rust and Verhoef 2005; Ryals 
2005). Secondly, there are several studies (Jayachandran et al. 2005; Mithas et 
al. 2005; Srinivasan and Moorman 2005) reporting positive effects of CRM 
investments on customer satisfaction, customer retention or customer life time 
value. However, this study emphasizes the connection between CRM strategies 
and profit impact of CRM, which has not been addressed in literature from both 
the domains. 
3.3 Econometrics Model  
We use the finite mixture model to derive segment-specific demand estimates 
and profitability model. Our model of customer purchase behavior aims to 
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capture, at individual-level, the impact of markdown and marketing variables 
on consumer demand and profitability of category purchase behavior. 
    The level of analysis is at individuals’ category-purchase level for several 
reasons: First, purchase at category level is common behavior for fashion 
retailers. For example, the specific product category of a retailer would be 
replenished with different product (SKU) every business cycle. It is not feasible 
to study the pricing and marketing activities for a single product (SKU). Thus 
retailer’s revenues and profits are more closely related to category demand than 
to the sales of any one product (Levy et al. 2004; Nijs et al. 2001). Second, 
although the impact of promotions can be measured at the either the product 
(SKU), brand and category level, the category level is the most relevant level 
for retailers (Ailawadi et al. 2009). Meanwhile, compared with the vast volume 
of studies pertaining to the effects of price promotions on brand choice and 
brand sales, research on category-demand effects in a retail store remains sparse 
(Grewal et al. 2011). Lastly, in terms of profitability impact, maximizing profits 
at the category level appears to be the basis of most studies on retail pricing 
behavior (Chintagunta 2002). For example, Pauwels et al. (2002) provided a 
good example on breakdown of sales in category incidence, brand choice, and 
purchase quantity. 
    We elaborate the probability specification of demand and profitability model 
using FMM in the following two sections.   
3.3.1 Segment-Specific Demand Model 
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Suppose there exists S (s=1, 2, S) segments of consumers in the consumer 
market. Each segment consists of a number of consumers that are assumed to 
be similar to each other with respect to their sensitivity and responsiveness of 
pricing and marketing variables, while those consumers from different segments 
can differ. In other words, the model specification aims to derive segments of 
consumers that are homogenous in their sales responses (i.e. members of a 
segment have a common structural coefficients).  
    Suppose there are N consumers for the focal firm, each consumer i has made 
several transactions, each of which consists multiple category purchase 
incidences. In this case, we denote Ti as number of category purchases during 
the observation period for consumer i.  
    Following standard setup of finite mixture model (McLachlan and Peel 2004), 
the random variable of interest (demand) is assumed to be a draw from a 
population that is an additive mixture of S distinct segments with proportion (or 
probability) isP for individual i. The general mixture density of variables can be 
define by a convex combination of S segments probability density function (pdf) 
1
( | ) ( | )
S
ij is s ij s
s
f d P f d θ
=
Θ = ⋅∑ ,                              (0.13) 
where ( | )s ij sf d θ  is the pdf of segment s, Θ is the set of parameters to 
characterize segmentation. isP  is the mixing proportions (or probability) that 
consumer i belongs to Segment s. We then specific isP  and ( | )s ij sf d θ  
separately as follow. 
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    The segment probability isP  is specified to be determined by a vector of 
consumer-level variables such as demographic or behavioral variables. 
Following Gupta and Chintagunta (1994) and Vermunt and Magidson (2005), 
we assume the values of segment memberships follow multinomial distribution, 


















,                            (0.14) 
where sδ  is the segment-specific parameters that captures the effects of 
individual-specific variables on the probability of segmentation membership 
( isP ), through a non-linear specification. This multinomial-logit specification 





=∑ by the 
specification (Please refer to Gupta and Chintagunta (1994), pp. 130 for details 
of a similar reformulation of the probability specification). 
Individual level Covariates for Customer Segmentation 
This study considers consumer demographic and behavioral-based 
characteristics as covariates for segments ( Zi ).  The use of demographic 
variables to predict segmentation has long been used in the literatures (Gupta 
and Chintagunta 1994) and practice, because the resulted segmentation scheme 
would be actionable and easier to implement by marketing managers for target 
marketing. However, the mere uses of demographic variables do not produce 
satisfactory segmentation due to the problem of incomplete demographic data 
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(Allenby and Rossi 1998). This problem is particular evident, as the data of this 
study is from a fashion retail chain from Singapore, where the customer 
demographic are very similar across segments. 
    This study focuses on behavioral-based consumer segmentation, which refers 
to group customer according to their behavioral patterns from purchase history. 
With the prevalence of CRM system and loyalty program, retailers now 
frequently capture information on purchase histories and use it to develop 
pricing and marketing strategies. As discussed previously, Verhoef et al. (2003) 
showed that RFM is among the most popular segmentation and predictive 
modeling techniques used by marketers. In this study, we also adopt Regency-
Frequency-Monetary (RFM), which is probably the most commonly used 
descriptive metrics to capture consumers’ purchase pattern because of its 
simplicity and reasonable performance. In particular, three variables represent 
this past behavior: (1) the period elapsed since the customer's last purchase 
(Recency; R), (2) the number of purchases in an arbitrary period in the past 
(Frequency; F), and (3) the total monetary value of purchases (Monetary value; 
M). Previous studies have shown that RFM alone can offer a powerful way of 
predicting the future customer purchase (Blattberg et al. 2008; Hughes 2006). 
Moreover, we also consider using length of relationships (tenure) to capture the 
relationship aspects of customer characteristics. 
    Cross buying behavior refers to the purchase of products from multiple 
categories, which is an important antecedent to consumer-purchase, profitability 
and loyalty (Reinartz et al. 2008). The rationale behind the stream of literature 
is that if a customer buys from different categories offered by the same firm, he 
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or she would experience greater attachment to the firm and would naturally has 
higher demand and profitability. In other words, buyers with cross-buying may 
aims to maximize the utility obtain from buying from the single retailer.  This 
argument could also been support by transaction cost theory, in which if 
customers build up switching costs in terms of multiple product ownership 
(cross-buying), their relationships becomes longer (Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997).  
 
Figure 5 Probability Distribution of Demand 
    Back to the FMM model specification, the demand of category-transaction 
conditional on segmentation is then modeled using Poisson demand model due 
to the nature of demand (See Figure 5 for the probability density of the demand). 













θ λ= −                               (0.15) 
where  
  exp( )ijs o s ijXλ β β= +                                  (0.16) 
The vector ijX  denotes a set of predictor variables that explain the 
demand/purchase quantity at transaction level. Specifically ijX  contains 
several variables that specify the transaction demand, which will be discussed 
as follows. 
Demand Function Specification 
This study is based on setting of fashion goods industry, in which consumers 
need to visit the physical stores to purchase goods. With the presence of CRM 
system, retailers are able to identify the customer and the transaction details at 
the point of purchase. In this way, we formulate the demand of a purchase 
incidence as a linear function of several explanatory variables at the transaction 
level. 
    First, the level of markdown and the original price of the product naturally 
determine the demand of category purchase. Consistent with the Poisson 
specification, we model the demand essentially as an exponential demand 
function, which is extensively used in marketing and operational research 
literature (Hanssens and Parsons 1993; Jeuland and Shugan 1988; Song et al. 
2008). In such model, the demand response to price markdown follows an 
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increasing returns to scale (see Huang et al. (2013) for a detailed review of 
demand model), which fits the reality in fashion retail industry, in which a huge 
bump in sales usually come with a deep markdown. Another advantage of 
exponential demand specification is the easy of interpretation for policy 
implication after a log-transformation of demand. Furthermore, we model the 
markdown depth as the ratio of promotion amount due to markdown over the 
posted price of the product. For example, a 0.05 markdown is equivalent to an 
average 5% direct discount offered to a category purchase incidence. 
    We also include a number of non-price promotion dummies to account for 
effects other promotional on sales. For example, retailers frequently organized 
special sales events to advertise the brand and stores. Generally, price-oriented 
promotions (markdown) are used primarily for their ability to meet short-term 
objectives such as profit maximization and inventory control, while non-price 
promotions are used mostly for achieving long-term results such as fostering 
consumer loyalty. Other than markdown and promotion variables, in apparel 
retail industries, there are strong seasonal patterns. In this study, we study 
fashion retailers, which replenish inventory every six months. Within a six-
month period, retailer initially charges relative high prices but offers 
increasingly deep markdown toward the end of the season. As a result, such 
seasonal price and promotion patterns are likely to cause strategic effects. We 
include seasonal variables to captures the seasonal impact as a demand shock of 
seasonal goods. Please note that the empirical context of the study is a retail 
chain in Singapore, where the traditional four seasons does not appear, but the 
conventional shopping seasons plays a key role in the seasonal demand pattern. 
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Last but not list, for the robustness of estimation, we control for unobserved 
store-specific (locations, size, traffic) and category-specific characteristics (e.g. 
product design, styles, and colors), which could largely affect the demand. The 
detailed operationalization of the variables will be discussed in Section 3.4. 
    In summary, the Poisson rate of the Poisson-like demand can be specify with 
the following econometric specification: 
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     (0.17)  
where ijK  is the depth of markdown, ijOP  is the original posted price, 
ijPROMO  denotes a sets of non-price based promotion dummies, ijSEASON is 
a dummy variable that accounts for whether the transaction is during a shopping 
seasons such as Christmas. ijCATEGORY  and ijSTORE  are the store and 
category dummies for controlling unobserved categories and store fixed effect.  
    One benefit for above demand specification is to allow demand aggregation 
across items within a category, with the markdown and promotions are all 
performed at the category level. To see this, suppose now the Poisson demand 
is at individual product level instead of category, then the Poisson demand can 
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where 0ijsλ  is the baseline demand at product level when there is no markdown 
and price is at original price level. In the empirical context of the study, the 
complete pricing and marketing mix including price markdown and other 
promotion are specified at category level, which is prevalent in fashion industry 
as category management. In this case, the specification allows us to aggregate 
demand at category level by treat 0ijsλ  as category level baseline demand, as the 
baseline demand are product-specific. 
    Please note that in this finite mixture model specification, the covariates alone 
do not determine the segmentation. Instead, the Poisson regression model plays 
a major role in predicting segmentation membership. In other words, this 
prediction/segmentation is based on consumers’ demand responses on the sales 
variables as well as consumer level covariates. In the finite mixture model 
approach, the posterior classification probabilities do not only depend on 
covariate, but also the response to dependent variables. Intuitively, the model 
determines which segment-specific regression model fits best to the responses 
of an individual consumer. The better that a regression model associated with a 
particular segment fits, the higher the probability of a customer belonging to 
that segment. For example, markdown sensitive consumers are assigned to the 
class for which the regression shows higher markdown effects. 
    Given the above specification of demand and segmentation probability, the 
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69 
 
By maximizing the log-likelihood function, the unknown parameters of the 
model  and can be estimated simultaneously for each segment (Kamakura 
and Russell 1989; Wedel and Kamakura 2000). Subsequently, each individual 
customer would be classified to a segment through a posterior probability by 
choosing the highest posterior probability among segments. 
3.3.2 Profitability Model and Optimal Markdown 
Profitability Specification and Optimal Demand 
Following the similar finite mixture modeling approach in the previous Poisson 
demand specification, the profitability of transaction is modeled as product of 
demand by the sales price. Specifically, given the demand specification, the 
profit function is transformed as follow: 
1 2 3
4 5
( (1 ) )
exp(
) ( (1 ) )
ij ij ij ij ij
o ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij ij
Profit OP K C
K OP PROMO
SEASON CATEGORY OP K C
λ
β β β β
β β
= ⋅ − −
= + + + +
+ ⋅ − −
       (0.20) 
where ijC  is the marginal cost of goods sold, ijOP is the original posted price 
and (1 )ij ijOP K− captured the price after a pricing markdown. The rest of the 
variables follow the same notation as previous demand model. Due to the 
limitation of data on marginal cost, we further assume the marginal cost as a 
percentage of posted prices. i.e. ij ijC l OP= × , where l is the ratio of marginal 
cost over posted price. 
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    We focuses on Log of profit as dependent variable due to the following 
reasons: First, the log-transformation of profit allows researchers and 
practitioners to easily interpretation the profit impact of explanatory variables 
because of the elasticity nature of the results. Second, the finite mixture 
modeling requires the underlying probability distribution to be pre-specified 
with known class of probability distribution. Since distribution of profit is left 
skewed, the log-transformation made density plot of log (profit) a standard 
normal distribution, as shown in Figure 6. Lastly, the profitability specification 
is naturally transformed from a Poisson demand exponential specification from 
previous section. As a result, the dependent variable is denote as ijy , 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
ln( )
ln(1 ) ln( )
ij ij
o ij ij ij ij
ij ij ij
y Profit
K l K OP OP
PROMO SEASON CATEGORY
β β β β β
β β β ε
=
= + + − − + +
+ + + +
        (0.21)
 
    This profit formulation has several important properties. First, it reveals the 
classical inverted U shape relationship between profit and the level markdown 
down ijK , which is the key decision variable of the study. To see this, the linear 
term ijK  is increasing but the ln(1 )ijl K− − in deceasing in ijK , holding other 
factors constant. To the best of my knowledge, similar specification has not 
been discussed in the literature, and we aim to fill the gap by investigating this 
specification. In this case, as retailer graduate increase markdown, the profit 
will first increase, then decrease drastically. This specification reflects the 
demand reality in fashion industry because deep discount is always associated 
with relatively lower profit, even though it increases demand significantly. 
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    As a result, we are able to derive optimal level or K based on the profit model 
and parameter estimates. Ceteris paribus, take First-Order-Condition (FOC) of 
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Figure 6 Probability Distribution of Profit 
    We follow similar model formulation as in the previous section except 
change the dependent variable to log of transaction profitability with new class 
of probability distribution. Similarly the general mixture density of variables 
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where ( | )s ij sf y θ  is the pdf of Segment s, Θ is the set of parameters to 
characterize segments. isP  are the mixing proportions (probability) that 
consumer i is in Segment s. we use the similar sets of covariates as discussed 
previous section to predict segment memberships, which follow multinomial 
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    Based on the density plot in Figure 6, the segment density functions ( | )s sf y θ
for log-profit y are assumed to be normal distributed, 
2
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where    
ijs o s ijXµ β β= +  
    The dependent variable is thus log (profitability) ijy . The vector ijX  denotes 
a set of predictor variables that explain the profitability at category-transaction 
level. Generally the explanatory variables is similar as in demand model, but 
with different functional form following equation (3.9). Specifically, the log-
profit can be written as following,  
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3.4 Data and Variables 
3.4.1 Research Background 
This study uses data from a major fashion retail chain named FKB2 located in 
Singapore. The retailer is specializing in Kids and Baby apparels operating in 
32 physical retail stores around the city-state. Due to the stable climate and 
weather in Singapore all year around, fashion industry in Singapore follows a 
unique seasonal pattern for demand and sales planning. Unlike many other 
countries with four-season climate, the seasonality of the demand is mainly 
driven by the conventional shopping seasons, which are Chinese New Year, 
Great Singapore Sales in every June and Christmas period. FKB’s follows a six-
month business cycle throughout the year. The first business cycle starts from 
January to June, in which the summer school holiday and great Singapore Sales 
ends. The second business circles starts from July until the Christmas holiday 
ends. The exact start and end of the season is clearly defined the by FKB in their 
sales and promotion calendar. Markdown and promotion planning, as well as 
inventory holding are done for each business cycle ahead of the business cycles 
to ensure smooth business operation.  
FKB sells fashion items across five major product categories, which are Baby 
Girls, Baby Boys, Kids Girls, Kids Boys and Accessories. The product category 
2 Real name of the retailer is not revealed due to a non-disclosure agreement. 
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in this study is defined at sub-category level in FKB. For example, we consider 
“Baby Girl Tee” as a product category instead of “Baby Girl” or “Tee” as 
product category. The rationale behind this level of analysis is as follows. First, 
the product in this level of category are extremely similar in terms of product 
posted price and cost, and are mainly varies in terms of design and colors. Please 
refer to Appendix D for descriptive statistics of FKB’s Top 10 product 
categories, which justifies the assumption that that the product price and costs 
are very close within a product category, but difference across categories. 
Second, there is strong substitution within product category and nearly no 
substation between the product categories due to nature of product 
categorization, which eliminates cross-category price elasticity. For example, 
the price of a Baby Girl Pants is expected to have no impact on demand of Baby 
Girl Tee. Thirds, FKB are planning and implementing markdown and 
promotion management at the category level. For example, they would offer 20% 
discount to certain categories such as “Kids Girl Tee”. 
    FKB has a well-established CRM system through a point-based loyalty 
program, which currently has over 100,000 members. The CRM system and its 
loyalty program (LP) have two distinct features. First, LP is designed as a 
program that allows consumers to accumulate points for future rebates (=6%) 
when they make repeated purchases with a firm. This feature aims to reward 
consumers for repeated purchase and foster customer loyalty in the long-run. 
Second, LP members are eligible for direct discount and markdown during the 
specific promotion period. In this case, the direct markdown is frequently 
offered during shopping seasons for competing with other fashion brands or 
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during the end of business cycle for inventory clearance. Moreover, FKB 
frequency offers various types of non-price based promotion activities for 
advertising purpose. For examples, FKB organized brand-specific event 
campaign such as Kids fashion shows, store-opening events and anniversary 
celebration through large featured and display ads. FKB also actively 
collaborate with external banks and credit card companies and offer bank-
specific promotion offer to consumers. 
3.4.2 Data and Variable Operationalization 
The data includes the complete and detailed transaction data and member profile 
data from FKB’s CRM system. The observation window is from January 2011 
to June 2013. We consolidate the transaction data from CRM data at category-
purchase level to identify pricing, demand and profit from Point-of-Sales (POS) 
and CRM data. Moreover, based on FKB’s markdown schedule and promotion 
calendar, we consolidate a detailed daily promotion dummies and matched them 
with the category purchase incidences.  For the tractability of the analysis, we 
only include repeated consumers who made at least two transactions during the 
observation period. To tackle the problem of censoring issue of unobserved 
transaction outside the observation window, we only include consumers who 
join the loyalty program within the observation window. As a result, there are 
in total 9.427 customers in our sample, each of which with an average 8.06 
category purchases. The following sections discussed the specification and 
operationalization of the variables. 
Individual Level Covariate for Consumer Segmentation 
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We include several important demographic variables as explanatory variables. 
Specifically, age, gender, marriage status are included following the standard 
operationalization. We also include the nationality as a covariate because about 
one-fourth of the population in the country are residences with foreign 
nationalities.  As a result, we operationalize the nationality as dummy variable 
which equals to zero if the customer has a foreign nationality. Moreover, we 
also include a variable named “opt-in” to capture whether the consumer is 
willing to receive newsletter and promotion message via mail, email or SMS. 
The “opt-in” is thus takes value from 0 to 3, indicating consumers’ attitude 
towards the marketing communication. 
    The Behavioral-based covariate includes RFM and cross-buying variables. 
Specifically, based on the historical purchase data, we measure the recency as 
the time elapses (in weeks) since last purchase to the last day of observation 
windows. Frequency is measured by the average frequency of purchases, i.e. the 
average number of transaction per week. Monetary value refers to the total 
dollar amount during the past six months, the standard business and product 
lifetime cycle. Lastly, we also include a relational variable “tenure” as the 
number of days since the customer becomes a loyalty program member. The 
cross-buying variables are operationalized with two variables following a study 
by Reinartz et al. (2008). The first measure is the “width” of cross-buying is the 
average the total number of distinct product categories from which he or she has 
purchased per transaction. In this case, it captures the width of the cross-buying 
behavior. The second variable captures the dispersion of spending across 
categories. Suppose there are two customers who buy from three different 
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product categories. However, one person spread the purchase evenly across the 
three categories, while the other primarily buy from one single product category 
and spend very less from the rest of the two categories. In this case, a measure 
called “balance” of the cross-buying measures the degree of spread (or 
concentration) of spending across the categories. Specifically, we computer the 
purchasing share percentage for all product categories and then derive the 
standard deviation of these share percentage. In this case, customer exhibits high 
concentration of purchase behavior (purchases predominately in one category) 
if the balance value is high. 
Markdown and Promotion Variable at Transaction Level 
As discussed previously, the pricing, promotion variables are constructed at 
transaction level. Specifically, the markdown variable is constructed by the 
percentage of markdown that is offered to consumer for the category-purchase, 
and is a variable from zero to one. The non-priced promotion dummies are 
generated from the FKB’s marketing and promotion calendar, which determines 
the promotion activities ahead of a six-month business cycle. In particular, we 
include sales events (e.g. Fashion Shows, Brand Anniversary, and Store-
opening), and collaboration promotion with Banks as the promotion dummies 
variables at transaction level. 
    We include several key control variables for controlling other unobserved 
factors that affect demand or profit. In particular, we add category dummy 
variables for category fixed effect and store dummies to store-specific factors. 
We also include seasonal dummies to capture the seasonality of consumer 
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purchase behavior. In this model, we code seasonal dummy as one if the 
purchase occurs during Christmas, Great Singapore Sales (in June) and Chinese 
New Year period.  For the ratio of posted price to marginal cost (l), we consider 
l=0.2 based on the product-level descriptive data (See Appendix D for example). 
We will test the sensitivity of this cost assumption in the later section for 
robustness check.   
3.5 Results and Discussion 
3.5.1 Estimation Results for Demand Model 
We use Latent GOLD® 4.5 (Vermunt and Magidson 2005) for the Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedures. Other statistical package such R with 
FlexiMix framework and Stata also provide implementation of finite mixture 
model. Latent GOLD provides a user-friendly interface and a fit to our model 
specification, and has also been widely used in literature (e.g. Bapna et al. 
(2011)). In particular, a latent class regression module is used to identify 
segment-specific estimates and model selection procedures.   
    To estimate the parameter Latent GOLD uses both the Expectation 
maximization (EM) and the Newton-Raphson (NR) algorithm, which are 
seemingly the most popular technique used to determine the parameters of a 





Determining the number of segment a finite mixture model is a critical model 
selection issue. Theoretically, specifying too few segment ignores segment 
differences, while too many segment results in unstable segmentation and 
estimates. In ideal case, the model selection requires the researchers’ priori 
knowledge of the populations’ structures, in which they can compare the model 
directly using statistics such as likelihood ratio test. In most practical cases and 
previous studies, however, the actual number of segments S is unknown and 
must be inferred from the data itself. The most commonly used criteria bases on 
the goodness-of-fit measure and quality of classification using entropy-based 
measure. Please refer to Appendix E for a detailed technical discussion of the 
two criteria. 
    In this study, we report various information criteria and quality of 
classification (Entropy-based Measure) to choose the acceptable number of 
segments. Following the common procedure, we estimate the finite mixture 
model for different value of S. The information criteria values for each value of 
s are listed in Table 2 in Appendix F. The measures generally suggest a two 
segment solution is a reasonable one for segmentation based on demand model, 
as AIC tends to over-cluster the data (Naik et al. 2007). Moreover, the entropy-
based measure of two segments is 0.59, and decreases with more or less 
segments, which indicates a generally good separation of the 2 segments. The 
pseudo-R2 increases from 0.11 to 0.15 for selected solution. 
   The descriptive statistics for two segment mixture model is presented to 
evaluate the quality of segmentation. The classification of segmentation is based 
on posterior segment membership probabilities derived from the multinomial 
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logit model. In other words, a consumer is classified as in Segment X if his 
resulted posterior segmentation probability for Segment X is the highest among 
all segments.   
Table 2 Descriptive of Demand-based Segmentation 
 Segment Mean 
Variable  1 2 
   
Demand 1.441 2.092 
Covariates   
Age  36.381 38.864 
Female  0.895 0.873 
Local (Nationality)  0.763 0.615 
Marital Status  0.916 0.881 
Opt-in 2.786 2.927 
Cross-Buying Width 2.140 1.978 
Cross-Buying Balance 0.063 0.043 
Tenure 575.983 601.590 
Regency 22.055 24.710 
Frequency 0.010 0.015 
Monetary  83.369 140.586 
   
Segment Size 0.683 0.317 
    Generally, the segments are segmented by several key variables such as 
tenure, local (nationality, marital status, and regency of last purchase. The 
relative size for each segment is relatively large (0.683 and 0.317), indicating 
the segmentation is sustainable (Wedel and Kamakura 2000). In particular, 
Segment 1 is characterized as consumers with relatively low demand, higher 
cross-buying, but low RFM value. In contrast, Segment 2 consumers can be 
characterized as high demand, lower cross-buying, higher monetary and older 
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consumers. Generally, such significant segments represent an important 
contribution of the study, because we clearly see cross-buying and behavioral 
characteristics are more effective covariates for consumer segmentation, 
compared to demographic variables.  The demographic variables are generally 
similar across two segments, which will be further validated in the parameter 
estimates in the results of multinomial logit in the later paragraph.  
    Table 4 shows the finite mixture model solution with 2 segments. A standard 
Poisson panel regression is presented for the baseline comparison. The Segment 
prediction model refers to the multinomial-logit segmentation model, which 
shows the covariate estimates for determining the segment of consumers. Figure 
7 shows the decomposition of the mixture density function based on 
segmentation. 
 
Figure 7.  Mixture Distribution of Demand Estimates 
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    In Table 4, we report Wald statistic to test whether overall segment-specific 
effects are significant for parameter estimates. A separate Z-statistics are 
computed to test the significance of each individual segment-specific parameter.  
Moreover, a Wald (=) statistic are reported to test the equality of each set of 
regression effects across classes. In other words, it tests whether regression 
coeﬃcients are equal between segments (testing the null hypothesis of equality 
of parameter estimates).  
Table 3 Estimation Results for Demand Model 
Model Poisson  Segment   




      
K 0.350*** 0.327*** 0.600*** 593.520*** 8.418*** 
OP -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.015*** 311.025*** 3.862** 
      
Event 0.004 0.006 -0.009 0.284 0.038 
Bank Promo  0.006** 0.005* 0.041** 8.013** 2.964** 
      
Season 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.047*** 19.203*** 3.934** 
Intercept 0.386*** -0.466*** 0.624*** 187.013*** 60.097*** 
     
Segment Prediction Model     
Age   -0.027*** 0.027*** 11.336***  
Female   -0.007 0.007 0.004  
Local  0.205*** -0.205*** 9.213***  
Marital Status   0.137 -0.137 1.739  
Opt-in  -0.401 0.401 0.846  





10.431*** -10.431*** 17.917***  
      
Tenure   -0.001 0.001 1.712  
Regency  -0.008*** 0.008*** 7.177***  
Frequency  -11.523* 11.523* 3.607*  
Monetary   -0.002*** 0.002*** 19.386***  
Intercept   3.980*** -3.980*** 7.038***  
      
      
Pseudo- R2  0.044 0.122 0.239   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
    Generally, markdown variables are generally significant based on Z-statistics 
and Wald Statistics. Compared to Segment 1, Segment 2 consumers are more 
sensitive to markdown and promotional activities. They are also more sensitive 
to the seasonal timing of purchase, i.e. more sensitive to seasonal variables. The 
results also include category and store ﬁxed effects that are not reported here. 
Generally, both category fix effect (Wald=) and store fixed effects (Wald=) are 
significant. 
    Results of Wald (=) statistics is to test the between-segment difference of 
response parameters (test the null hypothesis of equality). An insignificant Wald 
(=) statistic means that the two segments responses to the same degree. The 
results generally show that the cross-segment effect is not significant. The 
reason is partly due to the fact the number of segment derives is relatively small. 
    The parameter for multinomial-logit model is reported under the heading 
“Segment Prediction Model”. Overall, the Wald statistics in segment prediction 
84 
 
model shows the parameters for behavioral-based variables and cross-buying 
variables are significant, and the estimates for demographic variables are not 
(expect for age). In other words, behavioral-based characteristics (RFM, tenure) 
and cross-buying variables can effectively segment customers, compared to 
segmentation using demographic variables. 
3.5.2 Estimation Results for Segment Profitability 
Similarly to previous estimation of demand model, we present the segmentation 
and parameter estimates for profitability function following the model 
specification in Section 3.3.2. 
    The model selection procedure is also based in information criterion, quality 
and classification. Table 5 reports the value of information criteria, Entropy-
based measure and Pseudo-R2. The information criteria suggests that four-
segment solution is the best model, based on BIC and CAIC. For quality of 
segmentation, the four-segment solution gives us the highest Entropy-based 
measure (0.71), which shows good separation of segments. The pseudo-R2 is 
0.59 is the highest among alternative solutions. 
    The Table 6 reports the classification based on the posterior segment 
probabilities derived from the four-segment solution. First the relative size for 
each segment is large, indicating the segmentation is sustainable (Wedel and 
Kamakura 2000). Specifically, based on covariates, Segment 1 and 4 are 
characterized by relatively medium profitability. Even through Segment 1 is 
largest segment (47.3%) and Segment 4 (1.5%) is the smallest, Segment 1 has 
significantly higher value in terms of cross-buying and behavioral 
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characteristics.  On the other hands, Segment 2 (46.6%) and Segment 3 (4.5%) 
are high and low profitable consumers respectively. Note that the high profitable 
Segment 2 has significant less cross-buying than other segments. Generally, the 
demographic characteristics are very similar across the 4 segments, which will 
be further validated based the responses and parameter estimates in the profit 
model. 
Table 4 Descriptive of Profitability-base Segmentation 
 Segment Mean 
Variable  1 2 3 4 
     
Log(Profit) 1.834 2.011 1.677 1.810 
Covariates         
Tenure(days) 587.830 570.175 523.346 583.811 
Age 35.773 37.086 36.657 36.964 
Female 0.898 0.895 0.887 0.805 
Local 0.779 0.736 0.800 0.752 
Marital 0.919 0.920 0.850 0.871 
optin_level 2.796 2.786 2.714 2.878 
         
avg_no_cat 2.240 2.054 1.959 1.950 
avg_balance_cat 0.068 0.056 0.067 0.064 
         
Frequency 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.007 
Monetary 82.823 91.250 54.036 41.372 
Recency(weeks) 21.087 22.327 28.647 28.711 
     
Segment Size 0.473 0.466 0.045 0.015 
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     Figure 8 shows the decomposition of the mixture density function of 
profitability based on segmentation.  
 
Figure 8 Mixture Distribution of Profitability Model 
    Table 7 presents the parametric estimates of four-segment mixture regression. 
We also present a standard OLS estimates to compare with the segment-specific 
estimation results. 
Table 5 Parameter Estimates of Profitability Model 




    
Variabl
e  OLS Seg 1 Seg 2 Seg 3 Seg 4 Wald Wald(=) 

























-0.001 -0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 460.24*** 49.39*** 
        
Event -0.005 -0.003 -0.010 -0.001 0.313*** -0.00*** 4519.72*** 
Bank  0.002 0.004** -0.002 0.000 0.000 7.40 6.591* 
        
Season 0.009*** 0.003 0.017*** 0.000 0.000 55.33*** 54.072*** 








Prediction Model       
Age   -0.014*** 0.007* 0.001 0.005 25.50***  
Female   0.107** 0.106** 0.050 -0.263*** 8.67**  
Local    0.049 -0.100*** 0.097 -0.046 19.95***  
Marital 




-0.085 20.53***  
Opt-in  -0.059 -0.061 -0.183* 0.303 3.82  
Cross-buying 




-0.308** 120.77***  
Cross-buying 
Balance  2.360*** -6.274*** 3.061** 0.854 91.58***  
Tenure




-0.001** 111.29***  







Monetary  0.001 0.003*** -0.002* -0.002 52.07***  
Recency  -0.010*** 0.001 0.011*** -0.001 52.24***  
        
Intercept   -0.614* 0.419 0.661 -0.466 14.72***  
        
Pseudo- R2  0.42 0.644 0.478 0.990 0.990   
        
    Generally, the results show distinct pricing and promotion responses across 
customer segments. For the main model estimation, the Z-statistics and Wald 
statistics are highly significant for all explanatory variables (except for bank 
promotion). However, even though the Wald statistics are significant for all 
parameters, different segments has distinct response pattern. For example, 
Segment 1 and 4 (with relatively medium profitability) are very similar in terms 
of descriptive statistics, but Segment 1 is more responsive to bank promotion 
but Segment 4 is more responsive to promotional events. In this case, Segment 
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1 can be labeled as “Medium profitable, promotion sensitive” segment and 
Segment 4 can be labeled as “Medium profitable, events buyer” segment. 
Moreover, the Segment 2 with high profitability can be characterized by highly 
sensitivities to seasonal factors but insensitive to non-price promotion activities. 
In other words, Segment 2 can be labeled as “high profitable, seasonal buyer” 
segment. Finally, Segment 3 with low profitability is mainly characterized by 
covariate with low RFM value. 
    Wald (=) statistics for testing the between-segment difference is also reported. 
The results show significant response coefficient for pricing, seasonal and 
promotion variables. The results indicate strong cross-segment difference in 
parameter estimations. 
    In terms of Segment prediction model, although Wald statistics suggests that 
demographic variables are overall significant (except for opt-in) in predicting 
segmentation, it is not obvious based on the descriptive statistics in Table 6. 
Generally, based on the Wald test and Z-statistics, we see cross-buying variable 
and behavioral-based covariates have much stronger predicting power for 
segmentation. 
    In the above analysis, we present two segmentation schemes: demand-based 
and profitability-based segmentation. Intuitively, high sales in unit (demand) 
does not necessarily mean high profitability (Shapiro et al. 1987). Profitability 
captures not only the positive “demand-effect” due to markdown but also the 
negative impact of reduced profit-margin per item. In our analysis, based on our 
analysis, profitability-based segmentation provides a more-detailed 
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segmentation, which allows for more detailed classification and improved 
targeting strategies. 
    In fact, most previous studies in marketing only focus on the impact of price-
promotion on sales in terms of demand or sales quantity (Please refer to Section 
3.2.2 for related literature). From practitioners’ perspectives, the choice of these 
two critically depends on the business objectives. For example, demand-based 
segmentation could be only effective if retailers have inventory pressure to clear 
the stock near the end of the business-cycle. 
    A significant implication of the profitability model is to allow us to derive 
the optimal markdown level, following Equation (3.9) and (3.10), we are able 
to derive the optimal level of markdown, as reported in Table 8. The detailed of 
associated profit impact are discussed in the next section. 
3.5.3 Profit Impact and Optimal Target Markdown 
In this section, we analyze the sales response to markdown pricing of customer 
category purchases to show how the profitability model can be used to optimally 
offer target markdown.  
    First, follow Equation (3.10), the optimal level of markdown for each 
segment is reported in Table 8 for each consumer segment. Generally, the 
retailer should offer higher level markdown for high profitable segment 
(Segment 1 and 2) and low (or no) markdown to low profitable consumer 
segment (Segment 3 and 4). This is consistent with the conventional wisdom 
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that retailers should offer more markdowns for their profitable or loyalty 
consumers to in order to extract higher profit. 
    Given the customers’ posterior segment membership probabilities generated 
from the finite mixture estimation of profitability model, we can predict the 
expected profit-contribution as a weighted average of segment-specific profit. 
Given the segmentation profile, we consider the model-predicted profit with 
markdown=0 (price set at posted price) as the baseline profit at individual and 
segment-level, assuming the other marketing conditions (marketing mix, 
seasonality etc.) remains the same. We consider several scenarios for different 
common values (e.g. 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, and 40%) of 
markdown offered in different scenario. In practice the different values can be 
achieved by offering a direct in-store discount or issuing coupon. We then 
derive the new profit generated based on the segmented parameter estimates for 
each individual consumers. Lastly, weighted by individuals’ posterior segment 
probabilities, we predict the new segment profit. Then the segment-
specific/overall profit impact is given by the difference between new profit and 
baseline profit, divided by baseline profit. 
Table 6 Profit Impact of Target Markdown Strategy 
  Segment-Specific Profit Impact (%) Targeting Strategies 





5% off 1.82% 4.10% -0.97% -0.52% 2.77% 2.72% 0.05% 
10% off 2.94% 7.39% -2.37% -1.57% 4.83% 4.70% 0.13% 
15% off 3.23% 9.66% -4.24% -3.19% 6.03% 5.79% 0.24% 
20% off 2.61% 10.71% -6.61% -5.43% 6.23% 5.85% 0.38% 
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25% off 0.95% 10.34% -9.51% -8.33% 5.27% 4.72% 0.55% 
30% off -1.81% 8.38% -12.96% -11.91% 3.90% 2.28% 1.62% 
35% off -5.76% 4.67% -16.98% -16.19% 2.18% -1.56% 3.73% 
40% off -10.93% -0.86% -21.58% -21.18% 0.00% -6.86% 6.86% 
Segment 
Size 
0.473 0.466 0.045 0.015     
Optimal 
Markdown 
0.14 0.21 0 0    
    Table 8 reports the profit impact in percentage term comparing to baseline 
level for different markdown scenarios on the four segments solution that we 
derived from profitability model. The result provides key insights from several 
perspectives on target markdown strategy. 
    First, at segment level, the profit impact reveals how retailers should target 
to an individual consumer segment. For example, if a retailer is interested in 
only offering target markdown to Segment 1, the best strategy is to choose 15% 
among all the markdown scenarios; whereas the optimal markdown scenario for 
Segment 2 should be 20%. This is straightforward as the optimal levels of 
markdown from model are 0.1 and 0.21 for Segment 1 and 2. Moreover, the 
profit impact for Segment 3 and 4 are always negative in all scenarios. In other 
words, the retailer should not offer any markdown to these two segments as the 
profitability monotonically decreases with markdown depth.  
    Second, we consider a targeting strategy, in which the retailer only offers a 
flat rate of markdown and no targeting is implemented. In other words, the 
retailer would offer the same level of markdown to all four consumer segments. 
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The corresponding overall profit impacts for all segments are reported under the 
column “non-targeting”. The number is essentially the aggregate profit impact 
for all segments, weighted by the size of the consumer segments. In this case, 
we see the best scenario with highest overall profit impact (6.23%) is the 
scenario with 20% markdown. 
    Third, with the detailed segment-specific profit impact, the retailer can 
choose to only target to those profitable segment (profit impact>0) for each 
scenario. In this case, we can derive the overall profit impact of this “Optimal 
Targeting” on segment, which is presented in the table. The results show that 
the “20% off” scenario has the highest profit impact. Moreover, we also report 
the difference of profit impact between “non-targeting” and “optimal-targeting”, 
in order to quantify the economic value and impact of the targeting strategy. 
This difference can be also understood as the profit potential of target 
markdown strategy. Clearly, the profit potential increases with the level of 
markdown, which is consistent with the theoretical understanding on target 
pricing. Figure 9 presents the how the profit impact changes when the level of 
markdown changes, for all the four segments, as well as for the “non-targeting” 
and “Optimal targeting” cases.  
    Please note that the optimal targeting is not feasible due to the probabilistic 
nature of the finite mixture model. The consumers are assigned to a segment 
with the “largest probability” from the segmentation. For example, it is possible 
that a consumer is classified in Segment 1 but his/her actually belongs to 
Segment 2 in really. In this case, the target markdown pricing could be offered 
to the incorrect segment, which reduces the profitability. As a result, the profit 
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potential would increase when the quality of segmentation improved.  In the 
extreme case when the misclassification is zero, the optimal profit impact can 
be achieved. 
    The marketing cost of targeting is omitted in this analysis for the ease of 
exploration. However, in practice it can be specified as the per-unit cost which 
is proportion to segment size. I.e. targeting larger customer segments incurs 
more marketing costs on targeting. In this case, the retailer needs to compare 
the profit impact with targeting cost through cost-benefit analysis to decide 
whether to target a specific segment.  
 
Figure 9 Profit Impact of Target Markdown 
    The method to assess profit impact at segment level provides a simple 
decision heuristic for optimal targeting markdown; we summarize this simple 










5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
Seg 1 Seg 2 Seg 3
Seg 4 Optimal Targeting Non-targeting
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1. Estimate segment-specific profitability Model using Finite-Mixture 
Model Approach.  
2. Decide number of segments by information criterion and classification 
quality, and derive the optimal markdown as guideline. 
3. Compute baseline profit by assuming no markdown policy is offered. 
4. For each possible markdown policy (e.g. 5%, 10%, 15%), derive 
segment-specific profit impact. 
5. Compute the overall potential profit impact by only targeting on 
profitable segment and choose the targeting markdown strategies with 
the highest profit impact.  
    Please note that with the estimation of the segmentation and profitability 
model, a similar procedure can be performed to assess the segment-specific and 
overall profit impact for other promotion activities. For example, the scenario 
of this would be one for other promotional activities and campaigns. 
3.5.4 Robustness Check 
Profitability-based Model Selection 
So far we follow the standard procedures in the literature using information 
criteria and entropy-based measure for model selection procedures. The existing 
procedures purely based on goodness-fit measure thus it is data-driven and not 
necessarily profit-maximizing.  Assuming the alternative models with different 
number of segment are also “true” model, we are able to verify the model 
selection using the profit impact measures. In other words, we are interested in 
whether the model selected is indeed the profit-maximizing solution. As the 
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model selection information criteria are relatively close between solutions, it is 
necessary to examine the profit impact for each solution. Therefore, we report 
the optimal level of markdown, as well as their size for the respective segments 
in each solution. Based on similar procedures in the previous section, we are 
able to derive the profit impact in a hypothetical case, in which retailer set the 
segment-level markdown at the optimal level. Table 9 presents the solutions 
including optimal level of markdown (K) and segment size and overall profit 
impact when optimal markdown is offered for each segment for alternative 
solutions.  
Table 7 Profitability-based Model Selection 
Model Solution Optimal K and Segment Size 
Profit Impact 
at Optimal K 





























    Based on the results in Table 9, we see that that the 4-sgement solution still 
gives us the highest potential profit impact. The best markdown scenario 
(similar in previous section) for each segment solution is all 20%. Overall the 
higher markdowns are offered for customer with higher profitability.  
    Intuitively,  as we discussed, specifying too few segment ignores segment 
differences, while too many segment results in unstable segmentation and 
estimates. Overall the profit impact increases from 1-segment solution to 4-
segment solution at maximum then has a significantly drop in the 5-segment 
solution. Compare to the model selection criteria presented in Table 5, we 
observed that the trend is generally aligned with the entropy measure for quality 
of classification. Recall that the entropy-based measure captures the degree of 
separation based on derived posterior segment probability. The entropy measure 
gives an aggregate value of how strongly customers belong to one particular 
segment. Given number of segment S, Entropy-based measure will be zero 
when all posterior segment probability are equal for each cross-session 
(maximum entropy). This is consistent with the theoretical understanding that 
the targetability (Chen and Iyer 2002) determines the potential of profit impact. 
For example, if the segmentation can better classify the consumers, it will have 
higher profit potential.  
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    Overall, the result highlights the importance of the quality of segmentation 
(entropy-base measure) as the primary factor to determine the profit impact of 
segment solutions. Previous studies tend to over emphasize on using 
information criteria as heuristics for model-fit. This finding shows that 
profitability-based model selection could be more useful consideration; 
especially when the objective is profit-maximization and no significant 
differences in goodness-of-fit measure in alternative models are observed. From 
practical point of view, this consideration could also be more valuable to 
retailers as the profit impact is usually the key objective in segmentation. 
Sensitivity Analysis to Cost Assumption 
In order to see whether the model and results are sensitive to the assumption on 
marginal cost, we re-estimate the model using by assuming the marginal cost as 
30% of posted price. As a result, a similar four-segment solution is reported in 
Table 10 
Table 8 Profit Impact for Alternative Cost Assumption 
  Segment-Specific Profit Impact (%) Targeting Strategies 





5% off 2.35% 7.56% -1.54% -0.53% 4.15% 4.01% 0.14% 
10% off 3.55% 13.65% -3.72% -1.92% 7.10% 6.66% 0.44% 
15% off 3.43% 17.72% -6.58% -4.25% 8.54% 7.64% 0.90% 
20% off 1.82% 19.27% -10.15% -7.56% 8.20% 6.67% 1.53% 
25% off -1.39% 17.83% -14.42% -11.86% 5.84% 3.51% 2.34% 
30% off -6.25% 13.14% -19.39% -17.15% 4.89% -1.98% 6.87% 
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35% off -12.75% 5.12% -25.05% -23.39% 1.90% -9.80% 11.71% 
40% off -20.79% -5.98% -31.34% -30.50% 0.00% -19.80% 19.80% 
Segment 
Size 
0.569 0.372 0.045 0.014     
Optimal 
Markdown 
0.12 0.20 0 0    
    Overall, the results are similar to the main analysis in Table 9. The optimal 
markdown for Segment 1 and 2 reduced from 0.14, 0.21 to 0.12 and 0.20 
respectively, which are consistent with the theoretical intuition. In other words, 
the optimal markdown should be generally decreases with the increasing 
marginal cost. Moreover, we generally observed that the profit impact is 
generally more sensitive to markdown scenarios and different target strategies, 
which is also consistent with theoretical understanding.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this study, we proposed segment-specific demand and profitability model that 
can be used to identify optimal markdown policy and targeting strategy in 
fashion goods industry. In particular, we developed a customer profitability 
model and segmentation strategy based on customers’ demographic and 
behavioral-based characteristics and sales responses. By using the CRM data on 
members’ profile and their detailed transaction data, along with 
marketing/promotion plans of a fashion retail chain in Singapore, we used finite 
mixture model and estimated the impact of markdown and promotions on 
consumer demand and profitability. The analysis shows significant differences 
in pricing and promotion variables across the consumer segments. The derived 
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profitability-based segmentation allows us to investigate the profit impact of 
pricing and promotion and provide key implication on the optimal targeting 
strategy at consumer segment level. 
3.6.1 Implication for Research 
This study aimed to contribute to the existing research from three perspectives. 
Firstly, this study makes a significant contribute in the research on consumer 
heterogeneity in sales responses. In particular, we considered behavior-based 
variables as covariates for segmentation; while earlier studies mainly used 
behavioral-based approach via cluster analysis for segmentation. However it has 
been largely ignored when applying finite-mixture modeling. Moreover, earlier 
studies also showed that demographic-based approach is not very effective in 
FMM-based segmentation  (Allenby and Rossi 1998). Given the modeling 
advantage of FMM, our analysis demonstrated how behavioral-based 
characteristics and responses from CRM can be effectively used in FMM-based 
segmentation. We also took into account seasonality as a critical covariate in 
capturing the seasonality-nature of consumer demands in fashion goods market. 
    Second, this study focused on markdown pricing at segment-level, which had 
been largely ignored in markdown pricing studies, especially in an empirical 
context. On the one hand, existing studies on target pricing literatures are 
analytical, wherein consumer segments are often exogenously and explicitly 
assumed (e.g., (Chen and Zhang 2009)). On the other hand, empirical studies 
largely ignored consumer heterogeneity in the investigation of markdown 
pricing for fashion goods (e.g., (Heching et al. 2002)).  
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    Last but not least, from methodological point of view, our modeling 
procedure provides an empirical approach to determine the consumer 
segmentation and optimal markdown simultaneously. Subsequently, the 
analytical approach and profitability model can be used to determine the optimal 
level of markdown for consumer segments, which has key practical implications. 
This approach can offer critical insights for retailers for target markdown and 
promotion strategies. For example, for different markdown and promotion 
scenarios, our analysis showed different profit impacts for each segment and 
overall consumer population. Our analysis provided not only in-depth 
understanding about markdown pricing and profitability, but also actionable 
targeting strategy based on profit impact.  Most of the literature in marketing 
focuses on the selection of promising customers as  target for a promotional 
campaign, but much less is on addressing what specific offers to be directed to 
the target groups (Reutterer et al. 2006). This study fills this important gap by 
focusing the profitability analysis at consumer segment level. 
3.6.2 Implication for Practice 
Based on the profitability analysis and segmentation, this study can help retail 
managers to identify the high profitable/demand segment through more 
effective segmentation and offer targeted markdown and promotion strategies 
accordingly. Firstly, with the ubiquity of CRM implementation and availability 
of consumer-level historical data through CRM system, retailers are able to 
measure customer characteristics in several dimensions. These dimensions 
include not only consumer demographics, but also behavioral-based 
characteristics, and sales response to price and non-price promotions in terms 
101 
 
of profitability. The new segmentation-based approach used in this study can 
provide more new perspectives such as product category analysis (Andrews and 
Currim 2002) through cross-buying behavior for retail mangers to design 
corresponding pricing and promotion activities (e.g., cross-selling). 
    Secondly, our analysis provided segmentation and response analysis for both 
product demand and profitability. Comparing these two schemes, profitability-
based segmentation provides more detailed segmentation because it captures 
both the demand effect and price margin for a markdown pricing scenario. 
Intuitively, a high sale-volume does not necessarily mean high profitability. In 
practice, the choice of the two segmentation schemes could be based on the 
business objectives of firms. For instance, retailers can prefer to use demand-
based segmentation, when facing inventory consideration near the end of the 
business cycles or seasons. Meanwhile, suppose if the two markdown scenarios 
produce similar profit impact, demand-based segmentation could also be 
considered at the same time to fulfill the objective of inventory control. 
    Lastly, by using customer characteristics to segment customers, retailer can 
optimally target and reach the segments. Specifically, the model can be used to 
assess the optimal level of markdown at the segment-level. This provides the 
critical insights for retailers to assess the profit impact of various markdown and 
promotion scenarios, at both aggregate and segment level.  As a result, retailers 
can optimize their profit by targeting profitable segments and reduce offering 
markdown and promotion to low profitable consumers.  
3.6.3 Limitation and Future Research 
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This study has a few limitations that can be addressed in future research.  Firstly, 
this study focused only on demographic and behavioral variables for segments. 
The variable selection procedures, especially for the consumer-level covariates 
are largely considerate based on availability of data. However, this study 
primarily focused on proposing an empirical procedure for optimal markdown 
based on profitability model, rather than the variable selection problems. The 
variables for segmentation should vary based on industries and objectives, and 
availability of data. Theoretically, it can be demographic-based, behavioral-
based, product-spaced (e.g., assortment), psychological-based (e.g., attitude, 
intention), geographical-based, lifestyle-based, and even emerging social-based 
segmentation. Incorporating more segmentation variables could improve the 
targetability of segmentation-scheme, but the rationale of profit maximization 
remains consistent. Secondly, we did not distinguish types of markdown pricing 
mechanism. In practice, markdown can be framed via various forms including 
a direct percentage discount, absolute dollars off on the total bill or issuing 
voucher. Earlier studies have investigated the effect of pricing promotion 
framing on price expectation and choices (DelVecchio et al. 2007).  Such 
framing effect of promotion has been neglected in this study; and future 
investigation to distinguish the effects is an interesting research direction. For 
example, what are the optimal markdowns in terms of percentage for direct 
discount and dollars off as markdown should be set for different types of 
markdown for profit maximization. Finally, this study measured the customer 
profitability in terms of absolute contribution margin. Earlier studies used 
various customer profitability models to measure the profitability at both 
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APPENDIX A: Proof of Chapter 2 
Proof of Lemma 1 
In this subgame, similar to the proofs of proposition 2-5 in (Narasimhan 1988), 
we have that in this mixed-strategy equilibrium: 1) The price support for store 
price is continuous. 2) Neither form can have a probability mass point below 1 
in its support. Since LD  and cip  are exogenously given, we directly apply the 
results from Narasimhan (1988) or  Varian (1980) and get the results 
accordingly. ■ 
Proof of Lemma 2 
In this subgame, firms are essentially in Bertrand competition for the consumers 
who use LBS infomediary. As a result, the equilibrium price and profit would 
be zero for these consumers. For the rest of the (1 ) Lk D− consumers, 
(1 ) Lk Dα− of them would buy from L₁ or L₂, and (1 ) Lk D β−  consumers would 
buy from the retailer offering lower price. Thus the competition is equivalent to 








−  and (1 ) cL ik D pα− are 
equilibrium price distribution and associated profit. ■ 
Proof of Lemma 3 
The derivation follows directly from (Chen et al. 2002). First, the price support 
for Retailer 1 and Retailer 2 are continuous with 1 1 1 1( , ) ( , )
b m m c
L L L Lp p p p∪  and 
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2 2 2 2( , ) ( , )
b m m c
L L L Lp p p p∪  respectively. Second, Retailer 1's profit is the sum of two 
expected profits from two price intervals in two channels; whereas Retailer 2's 
has two mixed-strategies pricing in a single channel. In our model, we have 
1 1 1
1 1 1 2 1 1
1 2 2
2 2 2 1 2 2
2 1 2 2
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+ + −
 
Following Proposition 1 and 2 of (Chen et al. (2002)), with the exogenously 
given 1LD , 2LD , LD  and price cap cip , we can derive the equilibrium profit 
and price distribution as shown in Lemma 3. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 1 
By substituting eq. (8) into Lemma 1, we have. 
1 1 2 2
1 1
1 1 2 2
1 1
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2 2
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By symmetric setting, all stores should get same price and profit. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Substitute eq. (8) into Lemma 2. Following the same procedure that is used in 
proof of Proposition 1, we can solve for Proposition 2. By symmetric setting, 
all stores should get same price and profit. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Substitute eq. (8) into Lemma 3. Following the same procedure that is used in 
proof of Proposition 1 and 2 we can solve for Proposition 2. By symmetric 
setting, all stores should get same price and profit. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 4 
We draw a simple payoff matrix as follow. A, B, C, D represents the profit in 
Proposition 1, 2, and 3. 
Table 9 Payoff Matrix for LBS Adoption 
 Retailer 2 
Adopt Not Adopt 
Retailer 1 
Adopt A, A C, D 
Not Adopt D, C B, B 
 
To identify the Nash Equilibrium from the payoff matrix in Table 6, essentially 
we need to compare B and C, then A and D. 
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First, we show C is less then B, 
( )2 22
2 2
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The sign of the expression depends on the numerator. 
Since we know k<1-α, 
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As a result, we have shown C<B. 
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2(1 2 ) (1 ) 0kα α α− − − >  and there is one pure strategy Nash equilibrium is 
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"Neither Adopt", otherwise there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria for "Both 
adopt" and "Neither adopt", and a mixed strategy between the two. 






− = ⇒ =
−
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 there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria (A, 
A) and (B, B), and a mixed strategy between the two. 
2. If 1
3
α < , 
















, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria (A, A) and (B, 














APPENDIX B: An LBS Application Example 
 




APPENDIX C: Sample of Price & Promotion FKB 
Table 10 Examples of FKB's Markdown and Promotion 
Types Example 
Price Markdown End of Season Sales: 20% off 
Chrisms Sales: 15% off 
CRM-based Rebate  double points reward 
Voucher $10 voucher with min $100 
Events Kids Fashion Show,  
Store Opening Ceremony, 
Brand Anniversary Sales 
Freebie Free Toy, watch, bag with min $100 
Bank specific 
promotion 
20% for AMEX card holder, 10% for Citibank 
Card holder 





APPENDIX D: Descriptive Statistics of Product Category 
Table 11 Product and Cost of Product Category 
Product Category Mean Posted Price Mean Unit Cost 
BABY BOY SHORTS 26.89 7.02 
BABY BOY TEE 16.71 3.36 
• L/S TEE 19.16 3.85 
• S/S TEE 16.41 3.32 
BABY GIRL DRESS 30.68 7.08 
BABY GIRL PANTS 22.25 4.93 
• C PANTS 21.08 4.63 
• L PANTS 23.71 5.29 
BABY GIRL TEE 17.12 3.55 
• L/S TEE 18.87 3.69 
• S/S TEE 16.92 3.49 
KIDS BOY SHORTS 34.99 9.05 
KIDS BOY TEE 19.34 4.35 
• L/S TEE 23.97 5.31 
• S/S TEE 19.13 4.30 
KIDS GIRL DRESS 41.20 9.82 
KIDS GIRL PANTS 29.65 7.16 
• C PANTS 26.47 6.14 
• L PANTS 37.41 9.66 
KIDS GIRL TEE 20.06 4.55 
• L/S TEE 23.10 5.08 





APPENDIX E: Technical Details of Model Selection 
Researchers have used information criteria such as Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) (Kamakura and Russell 1989), Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
(Bucklin and Gupta 1992; Gupta and Chintagunta 1994; Kamakura et al. 1996), 
Consistent AIC (CAIC, penalize model with more parameters and higher 
number of segments) and AIC3 (Andrews and Currim 2003)   to determine the 
optima number of segments (Wedel and Kamakura 2000) for the data sample.  
Generally, the model with lowest information criteria should be selected.  
    However, no general consensus has been achieved on the universal best 
criteria to use. Instead it usually depends on the nature of research question and 
data. Numerous studies in marketing, economics and statistics are trying to 
evaluate the model selection criteria using simulations. For example, when a 
very simple model was used as the true model, BIC and CAIC were more likely 
to choose the true model than AIC, which tended to choose an unnecessarily 
complicated one (Lin and Dayton 1997).  Dziak et al. (2012) suggested that, in 
most of the scenarios (especially when sample size is large), BIC and CAIC 
almost always selected the correct model size, while AIC had a much smaller 
accuracy in these scenarios because of a tendency to over-ﬁt the data. Generally 
speaking, BIC provide more parsimony in most cases and generally perform 
well (Baudry et al. 2010; Tuma and Decker 2013). Nylund et al. (2007) 
presented various simulations on the performance of various information 
criterion and tests for selecting the number of classes in finite mixture model, 
in which BIC performed much better than AIC (which tended to over-ﬁt) or 
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CAIC (which tended to under-ﬁt). As a result, this study mostly replies on BIC 
for model selection but we also report various goodness-of-fit measures for 
comparison. 
    Quality of classification is also used to evaluate the model of finite mixture 
estimation. Particularly, when the information criterion is satisfactory, it is also 
suggested to use an entropy-based measure to investigate the degree of 
certainty/separation in classification (Desarbo et al. 2001; Jedidi et al. 1997; 













= + ∑ ∑  
    In this case, we report the entropy-based measure, which is between 0 and 1 
in the analysis. A value close to 0 indicates that the posterior probabilities are 
not well separated. In this case, the posterior segmentation probabilities show 
that every individual consumer belongs to every segment with equal 
probabilities. A value chose to 1 suggests a discrete partitioning of the sample. 





APPENDIX F: Model Selection for Demand and Profit Model 
Table 12 Model Selection for Demand Model 
 Information Criteria   
S LL AIC BIC AIC3 CAIC Entropy Measure 
Pseudo-
R2 
1 -101309.24 202756.49 203249.93 202825.49 203318.93 N.A. 0.11 
2 -100929.96s 202159.93 203232.63 202159.93 202159.93 0.59 0.15 
3 -100763.49 201988.97 203640.93 202219.97 203871.93 0.59 0.17 
4 -100649.26 201922.52 204153.74 202234.52 204465.74 0.62 0.18 
 
Table 13 Model Selection for Profitability Model 
   Information Criteria     
S LL AIC BIC AIC3 CAIC Entropy Pseudo-
R2 
1 -41396.97 82935.94 83428.96 83006.94 83499.96 N.A. 0.53 
2 -37197.30 74702.59 75771.97 74859.59 75925.97 0.63 0.57 
3 -31239.72 62953.44 64599.18 63190.44 64836.18 0.70 0.58 
4 -30226.46 61092.92 63315.01 61412.92 63635.01 0.71 0.59 
5 -29873.91 60553.82 63352.27 60956.82 63755.27 0.63 0.57 
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